Breaching of Indo-Myanmar fencing and suggested measures to counter it
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Brigadier (Retired) L Ibotombi Singh
In a major security breach, nearly 150–200 metres of the Indo–Myanmar border fencing was found cut in Manipur’s Chandel district. The incident is believed to have occurred at Changpol, in Chandel district of Manipur, between Border Pillars 67 and 68, an area predominantly inhabited by Kuki-Zo community on the night of December 02, 2025. This breach is part of a recurring pattern of vandalism and opposition to the border fencing project. Also, it has proven that these people are directly or indirectly benefitting from drugs, weapon cum warlike stores and human trafficking and other illegal trade, which is hampered by the recent fencing along Indo-Myanmar.
The ‘indigenous’ Kukis have no such reasons, but the fact that the illegal immigration of Kukis and Zos (Chins) from across Myanmar would come to a halt sooner or later and would see the dwindling down of the poppy plantations in Manipur, which garner thousands of crores per year as revenue for their private ends. There have been similar incidents this year where fencing poles were cut or stolen in the Moreh area. The incident has raised significant concerns for officials trying to stop illegal activities such as drug trafficking and armed infiltration.
Manipur faces a significant issue with illegal migrants entering via its 398 km porous border with Myanmar, particularly following the 2021 military coup and ongoing civil strife in the neighboring country. The influx of migrants, who often share ethnic ties with local communities (Kuki-Chin-Zo), has been a major point of tension and a contributing factor to the State’s internal ethnic conflict. As of August 2024, over 10,000 illegal immigrants were detected in Manipur in the preceding five years. Specific figures cited by the Chief Minister in May 2024 included 5,457 individuals found in Kamjong district alone, with biometric data collected for most. Over 40,000 Myanmar Nationals have reportedly sought shelter across Mizoram, Mani- pur, and Nagaland. This is over and above approximately 42000 Myanmarese Nationals, records captured by biometric mapping, who have transited through 22 designated crossing points since December 2024, as shared by the DG Assam Rifles, during his visit to Manipur in August this year. The primary driver is the violence and instability in Myanmar’s Chin State and Sagaing Region, forcing people to flee for safety.
The largely unfenced, porous border and the now-suspended Free Movement Regime (FMR)—which previously allowed residents on both sides to travel 16 km into the other country without a visa—have facilitated this movement. The primary driver is the ongoing civil war and violence in neighboring Myanmar’s Chin State and Sagaing Region, which shares ethnic and familial ties with communities in Manipur (primarily the Kuki-Chin-Zo people). The previously existing Free Movement Regime (FMR), which allowed people to travel up to 16 km across the unfenced border without a visa, facilitated this movement and was often misused.
Unabated and unchecked influx of immigrations, particularly in Manipur, have caused the following:
a) Changes in the demographic landscape, cross pollination between migrant Kukis and ‘indigenous’ Kukis/other tribes besides causing insecurity among indigenous communities like the Meiteis and Nagas.
b) Destruction of forest cover for new settlements and illicit activities such as poppy plantations.
c) Concerns over National security, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling.
To seal the open and porous Indo-Myanmar border and to counter unregulated movement causing major security threats, facilitating insurgency, arms smuggling, and illegal migration, which have been linked to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Manipur, a decision was taken in Feb 2024 by the Union Home Minister to fence 1643 kilometers long border between India and Myanmar, starting from Arunachal to Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. Further, it was stated that the Free Movement Regime (FMR) of the people on the borders between the two countries, which had existed unofficially since independence in 1947-1948 and was first legalised in 1967, is to be scrapped. Accordingly, the onus of fencing was given to the Border Roads Organisation. The fencing was to be based on Smart Fencing System (SFS) to include technologically advanced border security infrastructure to enhance surveillance and control in sensitive border areas. which includes a combination of physical barriers, sensors, cameras, and communication systems, allowing for effective monitoring and response to border threats. As per the report, about 50 kilometer or so of Manipur’s 394 km long shared border with Myanmar have been fenced.
No obstacle or fencing is impregnable, unless it is effectively patrolled and manned by the troops, which has proven that it is the men behind the fencing which will make it effective. History is replete with many examples like the fall of the seemingly impenetrable Golconda fort to the Mughals, German conquest of France via an unexpected ‘backdoor assault’ around the formidable Maginot Line, breach of ‘Great Wall of China’, and in the recent times, ‘Berlin Wall,’ and ‘Korean Demilitarized Zone’ were or has been breached many times. Assam Rifles troops, responsible for guarding Indo-Myanmar border, face challenges in adequately guarding the India-Myanmar border due to vast, difficult terrain, lack of infrastructure (roads, communication), and their dual role in border guarding and counter- insurgency (CI), leading to only a portion of their force being dedicated to border posts, making current numbers reportedly insufficient for the 1,643 km stretch, prompting calls for more specialized resources or forces, despite ongoing efforts to enhance vigilance and infrastructure. The current deployment of 20 Assam Rifles Battalions for guarding 1643 kilometers long Indo-Myanmar border, as shared by the Director General Assam Rifles, is grossly inadequate as the troops are vastly stretched out. Some ‘Challenges to Adequacy’ are
a) Vast & Difficult Terrain : The border spans jungles, mountains, and riverine areas, making patrolling and logistics extremely tough.
b) Infrastructure Deficit: Lack of proper roads, communication links, and border outposts (BOPs) hinders effective deployment.
c) Dual Role Burden: With battalions split between border guarding and CI ops, the troops on border security are stretch out to over 110 km per battalion on average.
While Assam Rifles are dedicated and increasingly equipped, their current numbers and resources are stretched thin for the massive, challenging border, necessitating further expansion, better infrastructure, and potentially specialized forces for truly effective management, Ultimately, the consensus in strategic analysis is that while systems can be highly effective and multi-layered, labeling any defense as ‘impregnable’ is a misstep. Constant vigilance, adaptability, and a pragmatic approach to security are essential to counter potential vulnerabilities and evolving threats. For effective border guarding and management of Indo-Myanmar border, there is an immediate requirement of raising 30 more AR BG battalions along with Command elements, and three Assam Rifles Constriction (Engineer) battalions, one each for the three IGAR to facilitate speedy construction of border fencing and later, the same force can be made responsible for maintenance and repair of fencing. Also, Assam Rifles should be conferred with powers under the Customs Act as done in the case of the BSF and other CPMFs.
In a major security breach, nearly 150–200 metres of the Indo–Myanmar border fencing was found cut in Manipur’s Chandel district. The incident is believed to have occurred at Changpol, in Chandel district of Manipur, between Border Pillars 67 and 68, an area predominantly inhabited by Kuki-Zo community on the night of December 02, 2025. This breach is part of a recurring pattern of vandalism and opposition to the border fencing project. Also, it has proven that these people are directly or indirectly benefitting from drugs, weapon cum warlike stores and human trafficking and other illegal trade, which is hampered by the recent fencing along Indo-Myanmar.
The ‘indigenous’ Kukis have no such reasons, but the fact that the illegal immigration of Kukis and Zos (Chins) from across Myanmar would come to a halt sooner or later and would see the dwindling down of the poppy plantations in Manipur, which garner thousands of crores per year as revenue for their private ends. There have been similar incidents this year where fencing poles were cut or stolen in the Moreh area. The incident has raised significant concerns for officials trying to stop illegal activities such as drug trafficking and armed infiltration.
Manipur faces a significant issue with illegal migrants entering via its 398 km porous border with Myanmar, particularly following the 2021 military coup and ongoing civil strife in the neighboring country. The influx of migrants, who often share ethnic ties with local communities (Kuki-Chin-Zo), has been a major point of tension and a contributing factor to the State’s internal ethnic conflict. As of August 2024, over 10,000 illegal immigrants were detected in Manipur in the preceding five years. Specific figures cited by the Chief Minister in May 2024 included 5,457 individuals found in Kamjong district alone, with biometric data collected for most. Over 40,000 Myanmar Nationals have reportedly sought shelter across Mizoram, Mani- pur, and Nagaland. This is over and above approximately 42000 Myanmarese Nationals, records captured by biometric mapping, who have transited through 22 designated crossing points since December 2024, as shared by the DG Assam Rifles, during his visit to Manipur in August this year. The primary driver is the violence and instability in Myanmar’s Chin State and Sagaing Region, forcing people to flee for safety.
The largely unfenced, porous border and the now-suspended Free Movement Regime (FMR)—which previously allowed residents on both sides to travel 16 km into the other country without a visa—have facilitated this movement. The primary driver is the ongoing civil war and violence in neighboring Myanmar’s Chin State and Sagaing Region, which shares ethnic and familial ties with communities in Manipur (primarily the Kuki-Chin-Zo people). The previously existing Free Movement Regime (FMR), which allowed people to travel up to 16 km across the unfenced border without a visa, facilitated this movement and was often misused.
Unabated and unchecked influx of immigrations, particularly in Manipur, have caused the following:
a) Changes in the demographic landscape, cross pollination between migrant Kukis and ‘indigenous’ Kukis/other tribes besides causing insecurity among indigenous communities like the Meiteis and Nagas.
b) Destruction of forest cover for new settlements and illicit activities such as poppy plantations.
c) Concerns over National security, drug trafficking, and arms smuggling.
To seal the open and porous Indo-Myanmar border and to counter unregulated movement causing major security threats, facilitating insurgency, arms smuggling, and illegal migration, which have been linked to the ongoing ethnic conflict in Manipur, a decision was taken in Feb 2024 by the Union Home Minister to fence 1643 kilometers long border between India and Myanmar, starting from Arunachal to Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram. Further, it was stated that the Free Movement Regime (FMR) of the people on the borders between the two countries, which had existed unofficially since independence in 1947-1948 and was first legalised in 1967, is to be scrapped. Accordingly, the onus of fencing was given to the Border Roads Organisation. The fencing was to be based on Smart Fencing System (SFS) to include technologically advanced border security infrastructure to enhance surveillance and control in sensitive border areas. which includes a combination of physical barriers, sensors, cameras, and communication systems, allowing for effective monitoring and response to border threats. As per the report, about 50 kilometer or so of Manipur’s 394 km long shared border with Myanmar have been fenced.
No obstacle or fencing is impregnable, unless it is effectively patrolled and manned by the troops, which has proven that it is the men behind the fencing which will make it effective. History is replete with many examples like the fall of the seemingly impenetrable Golconda fort to the Mughals, German conquest of France via an unexpected ‘backdoor assault’ around the formidable Maginot Line, breach of ‘Great Wall of China’, and in the recent times, ‘Berlin Wall,’ and ‘Korean Demilitarized Zone’ were or has been breached many times. Assam Rifles troops, responsible for guarding Indo-Myanmar border, face challenges in adequately guarding the India-Myanmar border due to vast, difficult terrain, lack of infrastructure (roads, communication), and their dual role in border guarding and counter- insurgency (CI), leading to only a portion of their force being dedicated to border posts, making current numbers reportedly insufficient for the 1,643 km stretch, prompting calls for more specialized resources or forces, despite ongoing efforts to enhance vigilance and infrastructure. The current deployment of 20 Assam Rifles Battalions for guarding 1643 kilometers long Indo-Myanmar border, as shared by the Director General Assam Rifles, is grossly inadequate as the troops are vastly stretched out. Some ‘Challenges to Adequacy’ are
a) Vast & Difficult Terrain : The border spans jungles, mountains, and riverine areas, making patrolling and logistics extremely tough.
b) Infrastructure Deficit: Lack of proper roads, communication links, and border outposts (BOPs) hinders effective deployment.
c) Dual Role Burden: With battalions split between border guarding and CI ops, the troops on border security are stretch out to over 110 km per battalion on average.
While Assam Rifles are dedicated and increasingly equipped, their current numbers and resources are stretched thin for the massive, challenging border, necessitating further expansion, better infrastructure, and potentially specialized forces for truly effective management, Ultimately, the consensus in strategic analysis is that while systems can be highly effective and multi-layered, labeling any defense as ‘impregnable’ is a misstep. Constant vigilance, adaptability, and a pragmatic approach to security are essential to counter potential vulnerabilities and evolving threats. For effective border guarding and management of Indo-Myanmar border, there is an immediate requirement of raising 30 more AR BG battalions along with Command elements, and three Assam Rifles Constriction (Engineer) battalions, one each for the three IGAR to facilitate speedy construction of border fencing and later, the same force can be made responsible for maintenance and repair of fencing. Also, Assam Rifles should be conferred with powers under the Customs Act as done in the case of the BSF and other CPMFs.