From streets to statecraft: Reading COCOMI’s January 31 rallying call

Dr Raj Singh
The first month of 2026 did not go without a protest rally in Imphal. The city witnessed a massive rally called by Meitei CSOs led by COCOMI on the last day of January. Rallies are not new to the state, nor is political anger. What is different this time is the direction of that anger. It is not aimed primarily at a rival community. It is trained at governance itself - at the way authority has been exercised, delayed, or rendered uncertain over nearly three years of conflict.
Read narrowly, the rally can be dismissed as yet another episode in a long cycle of protest politics. Read carefully, it looks like something else: a moment when street mobilization seeks to speak to statecraft, not merely to sentiment. That shift deserves attention, not alarm.
The signal beneath the slogans
Manipur’s conflict has produced many narratives, most of them loud and mutually exclusive. January 31 points to a quieter convergence. Even as Meitei civil society prepares to protest perceived failures by the Union government, Kuki-Zo organizations continue to express frustration over the absence of a decisive political response to their demands. The grievances are not identical; the conclusions are not shared. But the object of dissatisfaction is increasingly the same.
This convergence matters. In divided societies, it is rare for opposing communities to locate the problem at the level of institutions rather than identity. When that happens, it suggests a deeper exhaustion - one that rhetoric alone cannot repair.
Beyond the obvious explanation
The obvious explanation for Manipur’s prolonged instability is complexity. The state sits at a difficult geographic and political crossroads; it carries a long history of insurgency, fragile inter-community relations, and border vulnerabilities. Any intervention must be calibrated; any misstep risks escalation. This argument has merit. But it also has a shelf life.
After years of violence, displacement, and intermittent calm, explanations that rely solely on complexity begin to feel incomplete. What people experience daily is not the nuance of policy constraints but the uncertainty of outcomes - whether roads will be safe, whether schools will function, whether displaced families will return home with dignity.
Governance has not disappeared in Manipur. It has, however, struggled to keep pace with the conflict’s evolution.
When protection becomes a matter of belief
In any conflict zone, the most basic expectation citizens have of the state is protection - swift, impartial, and sustained. Over time, that expectation becomes less about announcements and more about belief. Do people believe the state will act decisively when violence erupts? Do they believe enforcement will be even-handed? Do they believe tomorrow will be safer than yesterday?
In Manipur, belief has thinned. As it does elsewhere under similar conditions, this erosion produces predictable behaviour. Communities turn inward. Informal defence mechanisms emerge. Rumours travel faster than official statements. Each incident is read not on its own merits but as evidence of a pattern.
At this stage, even genuine state action struggles to regain credibility. Every delay is interpreted. Every silence acquires meaning. Governance becomes a psychological contest as much as an administrative one.
Fragmentation and the problem of accountability
One reason for this erosion lies in the fragmented architecture of authority. Manipur’s governance involves multiple layers: state administration, central security forces, intelligence agencies, judicial oversight mechanisms, and political interlocutors. Each plays a role. Together, they can blur responsibility.
From a citizen’s perspective, the question is simple: who is in charge of restoring normalcy? When that answer is unclear, outcomes, rather than intentions, define judgment. This is not unique to Manipur; political science describes it as a “principal–agent” problem, where objectives set at the top are diluted by dispersed implementation on the ground.
The result is uneven delivery and growing frustration, even in the absence of bad faith.
Security without reassurance
Manipur’s location and history make a security-first approach understandable. But security, when not paired with political reassurance, often stabilizes territory while unsettling society. Enforcement alone cannot address anxieties rooted in identity, displacement, and fear of future vulnerability.
The language of governance in Manipur has increasingly leaned on criminal and security frames - illegal activity, arms recovery, anti-narcotics drives, etc. These measures may be administratively necessary and, in some cases, unavoidable. Yet when such frames come to dominate public communication, they risk leaving communities feeling catalogued rather than understood. What people seek is not only assurance that the law will be enforced, but confidence that everyday life will return to something recognizably normal.
This is where governance falters: not in capacity, but in connection.
The danger of prolonged hesitation
No government is eager to take irreversible decisions in a polarised environment. Decisive conflict management carries risks: it can upset allies, provoke backlash, or fail visibly. Caution is, therefore, an understandable instinct. But when caution extends indefinitely, it creates a vacuum.
That vacuum fills quickly with suspicion. Over time, administrative delay is reinterpreted as a strategy; prudence is read as indifference. There is no publicly established evidence that the Indian state intends harm toward any community in Manipur. Its institutions remain constitutional and legitimate. Yet governance is judged by experience. When outcomes remain poor for long periods, citizens begin to infer design where there may only be dysfunction.
This is the most dangerous phase of internal conflict - not when violence peaks, but when trust quietly evaporates.
Displacement as a moral and political test
Nothing exposes this trust deficit more starkly than the condition of internally displaced persons. Relief camps can keep people alive, but they cannot restore dignity. Rehabilitation, that is slow, vague, or invisible, becomes a daily reminder of state inadequacy.
Safe return is not merely a humanitarian objective; it is a political signal. If citizens cannot return home without fear, the state’s authority remains incomplete, no matter how many reviews are conducted or committees extended. Rehabilitation must therefore be visible, time-bound, and accountable - not only announced, but delivered.
When conflict spills sideways
Another warning sign is the conflict’s tendency to expand beyond its original fault lines. Fresh tensions involving Kuki and Naga groups underscore a basic truth: conflicts that are not decisively managed do not remain contained. Violence, once normalized, looks for new theatres and justifications.
This lateral spread is not an aberration; it is a symptom of governance stretched beyond its explanatory capacity. When institutions cannot resolve one axis of conflict, others begin to emerge.
Reading January 31 as a governance message
Seen in this light, the January 31 rally was less about confrontation and more about communication. It is a message, imperfect, emotional, and politically charged - that governance has not yet restored confidence. It does not reject the republic; it appeals to it.
That appeal should not be met with defensiveness or dismissal. Democracies are strengthened not when protests are silenced, but when their underlying signals are decoded.
What statecraft would require now?
Global experience offers no easy templates, but it does offer patterns. Societies that have emerged from deep internal conflict have done so when states demonstrated five things consistently: clear authority, visible neutrality, political courage, humanitarian seriousness, and accountability applied without selectivity.
India has the institutional capacity to do this in Manipur. What has been missing is coherence matched with urgency - a sense that governance is not merely present, but fully invested in restoring trust.
That investment must show itself in unified command structures, impartial enforcement that is seen to be impartial, a credible rehabilitation compact for the displaced, and structured political dialogue with defined timelines rather than open-ended assurances.
The question Manipur is asking
The streets are asking a simple question that slogans cannot answer: Is the state merely managing Manipur, or is it prepared to rebuild confidence there?
Peace cannot be postponed indefinitely without cost. Each month of hesitation deepens separation, hardens narratives, and normalizes fear. Eventually, the conflict begins to define governance itself.
From streets to statecraft, the message of January 31 is not about rage; it is about reassurance. Manipur’s crisis is not a test of strength. It is a test of steadiness, credibility, and the willingness to act before explanation becomes an excuse.
How that test is read and answered will shape not only Manipur’s future, but the credibility of conflict management in India’s most fragile regions.