China’s ‘Military Purge’ is a mirage and the world is falling for it
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Wangba Senjam
Every few years, headlines emerge claiming that China’s military leadership is in turmoil. Generals disappear from public view. Investigations are announced, usually without offering convincing details. Self-styled China experts and analysts rush to declare fractures within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and go on to predict weakening cohesion at the top.
The latest reports - suggesting a sweeping purge involving senior figures such as General Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission - fit neatly into this familiar, “clichéd” script, designed with the idea of keeping the rest of the world misled. The PLA chief leaking nuclear secrets to Washington for years ? That’s too good to be true given especially the historical reputation of the Chinese leadership remaining practically impenetrable to foreign intelligence, thanks to the brutal counter-intelligence tactics and strategies of the Chinese MSS.
The uncomfortable possibility is this : what looks like the reported “instability” may be a deliberate strategic ploy. And if so, China is once again exploiting a predictable weakness in how democracies like India read power.
Let me tell you why the “Purge” narrative is all too convenient for a power structure like China’s. Authoritarian systems do experience internal discipline and corruption crackdowns. China cannot be an exception of course. But genuine purges designed to consolidate power are rarely ambiguous. They are loud, unmistakable, and domestically focused. This episode, by contrast, is defined by partial information, controlled ambiguity and speculation largely driven by foreign observers rather than internal upheaval. That should raise a creaking red flag.
In strategic history, appearances are often curated. Controlled leaks, selective silence and performative discipline have long been used to shape adversary perceptions. The objective is not to convince one’s own population, but to influence how rivals allocate attention, resources and urgency.
If external analysts conclude that China’s military leadership is distracted, divided or internally preoccupied, Beijing gains something valuable without firing a shot: TIME!
Many of us have studied The Art of War in our pursuit of “strategic depth.” And I also guess some of us have followed through history books how the Chinese have strategically deployed its teachings in every possible realm: warfare, economics, diplomacy and even scientific pursuit. That is to say that deception is not an accident in grand Chinese strategy.
This is not conjecture rooted in mysticism or cultural stereotyping. Deception is explicitly embedded in Chinese strategic thought—from Sun Tzu’s insistence on confusing the enemy to Mao’s emphasis on misdirection and psychological warfare.
Western analysts, trained to treat transparency as a proxy for stability, often fall into the trap of mirror-imaging. They assume that visible tension equals dysfunction and that internal discipline signals decay. In doing so, they risk misunderstanding systems that are built precisely to operate without external visibility.
China does not need to appear strong at all times. It benefits when others think it is weaker than it actually is. Remember that Sun Tzu doctrine ? Because it derives a huge strategic payoff in the form of reduced urgency. This matters because strategic competition today is as much about psychology as it is about hardware.
Recent shifts in US defence planning, as categorically stated in the 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS), suggest a gradual diffusion of focus. China is increasingly framed as a long-term challenge rather than an immediate contingency, competing with wars in Europe, instability in the Middle East and domestic political pressures. Who knows if that surprising strategic “deprioritization” of China was “facilitated” by a well-thought-out disinformation campaign on the part of the China’s strategic circle, along with other factors like the increasing dedollarisation of the global economy, White House becoming like a stock and crypto market manipulation centre since the inauguration of the 2nd Trump Presidency and, of course, the ever-expanding Chinese naval capacity.
If perceptions of internal PLA instability reinforce this recalibration, even marginally, that is a strategic success for Beijing. Great powers do not always seek confrontation; they often seek delay.
So what does all this mean for India’s strategic calculus vis-à-vis China ? It wouldn’t be off the mark to suggest that misreading Chinese signals carries grave danger to say the least. New Delhi often assesses China episodically through border standoffs or diplomatic engagements. Beijing assesses India structurally : industrial capacity, political continuity, demographic trends and strategic endurance. So India also needs a strategic overhaul.
If India interprets reports of Chinese military “purges” as weakness or distraction, it risks strategic overconfidence. Judging from how China has usually behaved towards India, it seems to feel that it does not need to defeat India quickly. It only needs to outlast, outproduce and outplan. History also confirms that it is comfortable doing exactly that.
Indeed, the real risk is our complacency. It is entirely possible that the current reports reflect genuine internal discipline within the PLA. But even if they do, that does not negate their potential utility as strategic theatre. Reality and deception are not mutually exclusive, are they ?
The deeper problem lies elsewhere: in the eagerness of external observers to accept narratives that confirm their expectations about authoritarian fragility. However, in real geopolitics, perception often shapes behaviour more decisively than facts. China understands this and has, therefore, spent decades refining the art of letting others feel reassured while it remains patient.
But there is a very good lesson for the rest of the world, especially aspiring superpowers like India to learn : don’t confuse ambiguity with weakness, or silence with stagnation. Those who do may one day discover that what they mistook for disorder was simply preparation hidden in plain sight.
Also seen through the combined lens of Chatham House and ASPI - the two think tanks that I have closely followed for years vis-à-vis US-China dynamics -China’s rise looks less like a sudden surge and more like a long, deliberate climb through a matrix of information and disinformation waves about itself. Now that is clearly reshaping the global landscape, with the US now changing focus on its own backyard instead of trotting the globe.
London-based Chatham House tends to frame this ascent as systemic : China is no longer just growing richer, it is steadily embedding itself into global trade, diplomacy and governance while nudging international norms in directions that better suit its interests, especially across the Global South and Asia. ASPI, meanwhile, strips away the rhetoric and looks at hard evidence, showing how China has methodically built dominance across a wide range of critical technologies from AI and advanced materials to space and biotech through sustained State planning, funding and talent mobilisation. According to ASPI, out of 64 critical technological areas, China is ahead of the US in 57 and counting, with the former also leading in patent filings by over 70%.
That’s a massive lead, to say the least. Coming back to India, we don’t even make it to that competition, with Indian Patent Office sitting on lakhs of patent applications and the concerned authorities taking years to even clear scientific projects. My own patent application, pending with Indian Patent Office for nearly 4 years now, is a glaring example.
Together, their analyses suggest that China’s power today rests on a killer fusion of geopolitical ambition and measurable technological capability. This matters deeply when interpreting reports of purges or internal turmoil: a system that has spent decades patiently accumulating economic, scientific and strategic leverage is unlikely to be unravelled by surface-level personnel changes alone.
In other words, whatever is happening inside China’s elite circles, it is unfolding against the backdrop of a State that has already secured
many of the structural foundations of long-term power.
Last but not least, for India, or any other Nation for that matter, to be able to deal with China on an equal footing, they have to catch up with it in at least four future-determining areas: energy capacity, AI, quantum technology, nanotechnology and “dramaless” political leadership, of course ! If we miss out now for whatever reason, political, economic or military, it won’t be long before we find ourselves in the Chinese menu.
Every few years, headlines emerge claiming that China’s military leadership is in turmoil. Generals disappear from public view. Investigations are announced, usually without offering convincing details. Self-styled China experts and analysts rush to declare fractures within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and go on to predict weakening cohesion at the top.
The latest reports - suggesting a sweeping purge involving senior figures such as General Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission - fit neatly into this familiar, “clichéd” script, designed with the idea of keeping the rest of the world misled. The PLA chief leaking nuclear secrets to Washington for years ? That’s too good to be true given especially the historical reputation of the Chinese leadership remaining practically impenetrable to foreign intelligence, thanks to the brutal counter-intelligence tactics and strategies of the Chinese MSS.
The uncomfortable possibility is this : what looks like the reported “instability” may be a deliberate strategic ploy. And if so, China is once again exploiting a predictable weakness in how democracies like India read power.
Let me tell you why the “Purge” narrative is all too convenient for a power structure like China’s. Authoritarian systems do experience internal discipline and corruption crackdowns. China cannot be an exception of course. But genuine purges designed to consolidate power are rarely ambiguous. They are loud, unmistakable, and domestically focused. This episode, by contrast, is defined by partial information, controlled ambiguity and speculation largely driven by foreign observers rather than internal upheaval. That should raise a creaking red flag.
In strategic history, appearances are often curated. Controlled leaks, selective silence and performative discipline have long been used to shape adversary perceptions. The objective is not to convince one’s own population, but to influence how rivals allocate attention, resources and urgency.
If external analysts conclude that China’s military leadership is distracted, divided or internally preoccupied, Beijing gains something valuable without firing a shot: TIME!
Many of us have studied The Art of War in our pursuit of “strategic depth.” And I also guess some of us have followed through history books how the Chinese have strategically deployed its teachings in every possible realm: warfare, economics, diplomacy and even scientific pursuit. That is to say that deception is not an accident in grand Chinese strategy.
This is not conjecture rooted in mysticism or cultural stereotyping. Deception is explicitly embedded in Chinese strategic thought—from Sun Tzu’s insistence on confusing the enemy to Mao’s emphasis on misdirection and psychological warfare.
Western analysts, trained to treat transparency as a proxy for stability, often fall into the trap of mirror-imaging. They assume that visible tension equals dysfunction and that internal discipline signals decay. In doing so, they risk misunderstanding systems that are built precisely to operate without external visibility.
China does not need to appear strong at all times. It benefits when others think it is weaker than it actually is. Remember that Sun Tzu doctrine ? Because it derives a huge strategic payoff in the form of reduced urgency. This matters because strategic competition today is as much about psychology as it is about hardware.
Recent shifts in US defence planning, as categorically stated in the 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS), suggest a gradual diffusion of focus. China is increasingly framed as a long-term challenge rather than an immediate contingency, competing with wars in Europe, instability in the Middle East and domestic political pressures. Who knows if that surprising strategic “deprioritization” of China was “facilitated” by a well-thought-out disinformation campaign on the part of the China’s strategic circle, along with other factors like the increasing dedollarisation of the global economy, White House becoming like a stock and crypto market manipulation centre since the inauguration of the 2nd Trump Presidency and, of course, the ever-expanding Chinese naval capacity.
If perceptions of internal PLA instability reinforce this recalibration, even marginally, that is a strategic success for Beijing. Great powers do not always seek confrontation; they often seek delay.
So what does all this mean for India’s strategic calculus vis-à-vis China ? It wouldn’t be off the mark to suggest that misreading Chinese signals carries grave danger to say the least. New Delhi often assesses China episodically through border standoffs or diplomatic engagements. Beijing assesses India structurally : industrial capacity, political continuity, demographic trends and strategic endurance. So India also needs a strategic overhaul.
If India interprets reports of Chinese military “purges” as weakness or distraction, it risks strategic overconfidence. Judging from how China has usually behaved towards India, it seems to feel that it does not need to defeat India quickly. It only needs to outlast, outproduce and outplan. History also confirms that it is comfortable doing exactly that.
Indeed, the real risk is our complacency. It is entirely possible that the current reports reflect genuine internal discipline within the PLA. But even if they do, that does not negate their potential utility as strategic theatre. Reality and deception are not mutually exclusive, are they ?
The deeper problem lies elsewhere: in the eagerness of external observers to accept narratives that confirm their expectations about authoritarian fragility. However, in real geopolitics, perception often shapes behaviour more decisively than facts. China understands this and has, therefore, spent decades refining the art of letting others feel reassured while it remains patient.
But there is a very good lesson for the rest of the world, especially aspiring superpowers like India to learn : don’t confuse ambiguity with weakness, or silence with stagnation. Those who do may one day discover that what they mistook for disorder was simply preparation hidden in plain sight.
Also seen through the combined lens of Chatham House and ASPI - the two think tanks that I have closely followed for years vis-à-vis US-China dynamics -China’s rise looks less like a sudden surge and more like a long, deliberate climb through a matrix of information and disinformation waves about itself. Now that is clearly reshaping the global landscape, with the US now changing focus on its own backyard instead of trotting the globe.
London-based Chatham House tends to frame this ascent as systemic : China is no longer just growing richer, it is steadily embedding itself into global trade, diplomacy and governance while nudging international norms in directions that better suit its interests, especially across the Global South and Asia. ASPI, meanwhile, strips away the rhetoric and looks at hard evidence, showing how China has methodically built dominance across a wide range of critical technologies from AI and advanced materials to space and biotech through sustained State planning, funding and talent mobilisation. According to ASPI, out of 64 critical technological areas, China is ahead of the US in 57 and counting, with the former also leading in patent filings by over 70%.
That’s a massive lead, to say the least. Coming back to India, we don’t even make it to that competition, with Indian Patent Office sitting on lakhs of patent applications and the concerned authorities taking years to even clear scientific projects. My own patent application, pending with Indian Patent Office for nearly 4 years now, is a glaring example.
Together, their analyses suggest that China’s power today rests on a killer fusion of geopolitical ambition and measurable technological capability. This matters deeply when interpreting reports of purges or internal turmoil: a system that has spent decades patiently accumulating economic, scientific and strategic leverage is unlikely to be unravelled by surface-level personnel changes alone.
In other words, whatever is happening inside China’s elite circles, it is unfolding against the backdrop of a State that has already secured
many of the structural foundations of long-term power.
Last but not least, for India, or any other Nation for that matter, to be able to deal with China on an equal footing, they have to catch up with it in at least four future-determining areas: energy capacity, AI, quantum technology, nanotechnology and “dramaless” political leadership, of course ! If we miss out now for whatever reason, political, economic or military, it won’t be long before we find ourselves in the Chinese menu.