Can India capitalise new thaw of Indo-Myanmar relationship ?
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Brigadier (Retired) L Ibotombi Singh
The Indo-Myanmar relationship has entered a phase of deepened strategic engagement and functional realism following the five-day State visit of Myan- mar’s President, U Min Aung Hlaing, to India from May 30 to June 3, 2026. The visit, notably the President’s first official trip abroad since assuming office in April 2026, signals a major point of inflection.
India has reinforced its dual-track and engagement-first diplomacy to balance immediate border security with regional geopolitical interests. India maintained its classic stance by officially interacting with the central administration while simultaneously inquiring about the health and welfare of democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The visit marked a strategic recalibration of bilateral ties, Hlaing was accompanied by five Cabinet Ministers, three Deputy Ministers, senior Government officials, Buddhist clerics and business representatives. By hosting President Min Aung Hlaing at the invitation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India chose direct engagement over diplomatic isolation. The Ministry of External Affairs has clarified that sustained dialogue yields better long- term results than disengagement. As usual, there was a hype by Indian Media over Hlaing visiting India before China.
But Hlaing visited China twice after the military coup in February 2021, in November 2024 and September 2025. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar in July 2022, May 2023, and April 2026. Qin Gang, Wang Yi’s predecessor, visited Myan-mar in May 2023., and Jiang Xi, President Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy and Vice Chairperson CPPCC, attended the Presidential inauguration of Hlaing in April 2026.
During the visit, Hlaing called on President Draupadi Murmu, held wide-ranging discussions with PM Modi, participated in the Myanmar–India Business Forum, and business and industry interactions and site visits, like NTPC facilities for clean-energy initiatives and emerging technologies. Modi and Hlaing discussed deepening bilateral ties to further collaboration in trade, invest- ment, connectivity, development, capacity building, defence and security, border management, development assistance and cultural exchanges. Ironically, India is yet to fully optimize its strategic depth in Buddhism at regional and global levels.
Modi conveyed that India remains Myanmar’s trusted neighbour, and first responder in times of crisis, in line with India’s Neighbourhood First, Act East and MAHASAGAR policies. Earlier, Modi had met Hlaing on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Tianjin (China) last year to discuss defence, security, border management and trade. The talks focused on border security, regional connectivity, critical minerals, and countering Chinese influence, serving as crucial diplomatic engagement for both nations. Key shifts in the relationship include -:
a) Border Security and Regional Stability : This includes discussions about heavily prioritized border security and Northeast Indian insurgent activities along the 1643 km shared border. India continued to advocate for sustainable dialogue and enduring peace through an inclusive political process.
b) Connectivity and Economic Ties: The visit re-galvanised momentum behind long- delayed foun-dational initiatives. Both the countries have agreed to accelerate the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway and discussed a local currency settlement mechanism.
c) Border Fencing: India moved ahead with its sovereign right to fence the 1,643 km shared border, despite Chins of Mizoram want free transborder movement. Details regarding dedicated border gates and specific entry points were transparently communicated to the Myanmar delegation to maintain stability. Both Nations agreed to scale up intelligence and tactical cooperation to intercept drug pipelines and cybercrime syndicates destabilising India’s North Eastern States, like Manipur.
d) Myanmar Based Indian Insurgents : Many North East insurgent groups are based in Myanmar. and Therefore, India and Myanmar would need to launch a series of joint operations to neutralize insurgents/militant groups along the Indo-Myanmar border belt, akin to Operation ‘Sunrise’ launched in 2019. President Hlaing gave explicit assurances to New Delhi that Myanmar’s territory will not be allowed to host anti-India insurgent networks.
e) Critical Minerals: Discussions highlighted new cooperation in critical minerals and rare earths to diversify supply chains.
f) Cultural and Civilizational Ties: Emphasizing shared Buddhist heritage, the President’s visit began at the Maha-bodhi Temple in Bodh Gaya, promoting historical people-to-people connections.
Hlaing’s visit is in backdrop of the US lifting sanctions on several individuals/companies linked to Myanmar’s military junta in July 2025, and reports in September 2025 of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which controls the rich Chipwe- Pangwa mining belt in Myanmar, gathering rare earth elements (REE) samples at India’s request. Opposition and rebels in Myanmar (in touch with India) complain of New Delhi hosting Hlaing who “killed democracy in a military coup”. But Hlaing won recent elections and India embraced unde-mocratic Taliban who strip women/girls of basic rights.
Strategic Importance of Myanmar
Myanmar is China’s strategic highway to the Bay of Bengal. The China-Myan-mar-Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the deepwater Kyaukphyu Port has the same strategic importance for China as the China-Pak-Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar Port in Pakistan. For India, the strategic importance of Myanmar as the gateway to the East and its Act East Policy (AEP) cannot be overstated. The fighting within Myanmar has been forcing anti-Tatmadaw rebel elements into India and the prolonged violence has stymied the progress on the KMTTP and the IMT Trilateral Highway projects in which India is deeply invested.
Growing Chinese, US activity
China is a major defence exporter for Myanmar, but it has been arming both the Tatmadaw and the rebel forces. China’s aim is to secure its strategic highway through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal and counter American and Indian influence in the region, including Myanmar and Bangladesh. Also, China is a major defence exporter for Myan- mar, but it has been arming both the Tatmadaw and the rebel forces. China’s aim is to secure its strategic highway through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal and counter American and Indian influence in the region, including Myanmar and Bangladesh. The US, as always, is playing a double game, softening sanctions against Myanmar officials, while supporting and arming Myanmar rebels through Bangladesh. America aims to restrict Chinese influence in Myanmar and would love an India-China war to draw strategic and economic advantage
The US-China competition in Bangladesh is on the rise, which may have adverse fallouts for India. China continues to draw Bangladesh into its strategic sphere. Bangladesh has now allowed US Navy/other military vessels access to Chittagong and Matarbari ports. Both countries will share military, security-related intelligence and jointly monitor maritime and military activities. This significantly increases US presence and influence in the Bay of Bengal region.
Hlaing Assurance to India
Myanmar is now relaunching offensive against the rebel forces, including for gaining control of the REE mines. As per reports in March 2025, 240+ REE sites (2/3rd of total in Myanmar) came up in Kachin State after an emergency was imposed in February 2021. In the same period, China imported 170,000 tons of REEs from Myanmar. The insurgent Arakan Army (AA) with a strength of about 45,000, including about 13,000 in Rakhine and Chin states, controls almost all of Rakhine State and about 40% of Chin State. High-level talks advanced stra- tegic cooperation concerning critical minerals and heavy rare earth elements (HREEs).
This is a crucial pivot for India to secure tech supply chains independent of China. Rakhine State and its maritime ports is viewed more as a potential export and transit corridor from the landlocked Kachin mines, but transporting REEs requires massive infrastruc- ture investments (logistical, financial, and reputational risks) through rugged, active war zones
In conclusion, to expect the situation to normalize anytime in the near future would be naïve, not only because of the magnitude of rebel forces in Myanmar, but also the geopolitical power play in the region. Finally, the question is will the India-Myanmar relationship be allowed to grow in the manner both countries want, including successful completion and operationalizing of the KMTTP and the IMT Trilateral Highway, or will this be hostage to the US-China geopolitical rivalry in the region?
The Indo-Myanmar relationship has entered a phase of deepened strategic engagement and functional realism following the five-day State visit of Myan- mar’s President, U Min Aung Hlaing, to India from May 30 to June 3, 2026. The visit, notably the President’s first official trip abroad since assuming office in April 2026, signals a major point of inflection.
India has reinforced its dual-track and engagement-first diplomacy to balance immediate border security with regional geopolitical interests. India maintained its classic stance by officially interacting with the central administration while simultaneously inquiring about the health and welfare of democracy icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
The visit marked a strategic recalibration of bilateral ties, Hlaing was accompanied by five Cabinet Ministers, three Deputy Ministers, senior Government officials, Buddhist clerics and business representatives. By hosting President Min Aung Hlaing at the invitation of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India chose direct engagement over diplomatic isolation. The Ministry of External Affairs has clarified that sustained dialogue yields better long- term results than disengagement. As usual, there was a hype by Indian Media over Hlaing visiting India before China.
But Hlaing visited China twice after the military coup in February 2021, in November 2024 and September 2025. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar in July 2022, May 2023, and April 2026. Qin Gang, Wang Yi’s predecessor, visited Myan-mar in May 2023., and Jiang Xi, President Xi Jinping’s Special Envoy and Vice Chairperson CPPCC, attended the Presidential inauguration of Hlaing in April 2026.
During the visit, Hlaing called on President Draupadi Murmu, held wide-ranging discussions with PM Modi, participated in the Myanmar–India Business Forum, and business and industry interactions and site visits, like NTPC facilities for clean-energy initiatives and emerging technologies. Modi and Hlaing discussed deepening bilateral ties to further collaboration in trade, invest- ment, connectivity, development, capacity building, defence and security, border management, development assistance and cultural exchanges. Ironically, India is yet to fully optimize its strategic depth in Buddhism at regional and global levels.
Modi conveyed that India remains Myanmar’s trusted neighbour, and first responder in times of crisis, in line with India’s Neighbourhood First, Act East and MAHASAGAR policies. Earlier, Modi had met Hlaing on the sidelines of the SCO Summit in Tianjin (China) last year to discuss defence, security, border management and trade. The talks focused on border security, regional connectivity, critical minerals, and countering Chinese influence, serving as crucial diplomatic engagement for both nations. Key shifts in the relationship include -:
a) Border Security and Regional Stability : This includes discussions about heavily prioritized border security and Northeast Indian insurgent activities along the 1643 km shared border. India continued to advocate for sustainable dialogue and enduring peace through an inclusive political process.
b) Connectivity and Economic Ties: The visit re-galvanised momentum behind long- delayed foun-dational initiatives. Both the countries have agreed to accelerate the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) and the India-Myanmar-Thailand (IMT) Trilateral Highway and discussed a local currency settlement mechanism.
c) Border Fencing: India moved ahead with its sovereign right to fence the 1,643 km shared border, despite Chins of Mizoram want free transborder movement. Details regarding dedicated border gates and specific entry points were transparently communicated to the Myanmar delegation to maintain stability. Both Nations agreed to scale up intelligence and tactical cooperation to intercept drug pipelines and cybercrime syndicates destabilising India’s North Eastern States, like Manipur.
d) Myanmar Based Indian Insurgents : Many North East insurgent groups are based in Myanmar. and Therefore, India and Myanmar would need to launch a series of joint operations to neutralize insurgents/militant groups along the Indo-Myanmar border belt, akin to Operation ‘Sunrise’ launched in 2019. President Hlaing gave explicit assurances to New Delhi that Myanmar’s territory will not be allowed to host anti-India insurgent networks.
e) Critical Minerals: Discussions highlighted new cooperation in critical minerals and rare earths to diversify supply chains.
f) Cultural and Civilizational Ties: Emphasizing shared Buddhist heritage, the President’s visit began at the Maha-bodhi Temple in Bodh Gaya, promoting historical people-to-people connections.
Hlaing’s visit is in backdrop of the US lifting sanctions on several individuals/companies linked to Myanmar’s military junta in July 2025, and reports in September 2025 of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which controls the rich Chipwe- Pangwa mining belt in Myanmar, gathering rare earth elements (REE) samples at India’s request. Opposition and rebels in Myanmar (in touch with India) complain of New Delhi hosting Hlaing who “killed democracy in a military coup”. But Hlaing won recent elections and India embraced unde-mocratic Taliban who strip women/girls of basic rights.
Strategic Importance of Myanmar
Myanmar is China’s strategic highway to the Bay of Bengal. The China-Myan-mar-Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the deepwater Kyaukphyu Port has the same strategic importance for China as the China-Pak-Economic Corridor (CPEC) and Gwadar Port in Pakistan. For India, the strategic importance of Myanmar as the gateway to the East and its Act East Policy (AEP) cannot be overstated. The fighting within Myanmar has been forcing anti-Tatmadaw rebel elements into India and the prolonged violence has stymied the progress on the KMTTP and the IMT Trilateral Highway projects in which India is deeply invested.
Growing Chinese, US activity
China is a major defence exporter for Myanmar, but it has been arming both the Tatmadaw and the rebel forces. China’s aim is to secure its strategic highway through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal and counter American and Indian influence in the region, including Myanmar and Bangladesh. Also, China is a major defence exporter for Myan- mar, but it has been arming both the Tatmadaw and the rebel forces. China’s aim is to secure its strategic highway through Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal and counter American and Indian influence in the region, including Myanmar and Bangladesh. The US, as always, is playing a double game, softening sanctions against Myanmar officials, while supporting and arming Myanmar rebels through Bangladesh. America aims to restrict Chinese influence in Myanmar and would love an India-China war to draw strategic and economic advantage
The US-China competition in Bangladesh is on the rise, which may have adverse fallouts for India. China continues to draw Bangladesh into its strategic sphere. Bangladesh has now allowed US Navy/other military vessels access to Chittagong and Matarbari ports. Both countries will share military, security-related intelligence and jointly monitor maritime and military activities. This significantly increases US presence and influence in the Bay of Bengal region.
Hlaing Assurance to India
Myanmar is now relaunching offensive against the rebel forces, including for gaining control of the REE mines. As per reports in March 2025, 240+ REE sites (2/3rd of total in Myanmar) came up in Kachin State after an emergency was imposed in February 2021. In the same period, China imported 170,000 tons of REEs from Myanmar. The insurgent Arakan Army (AA) with a strength of about 45,000, including about 13,000 in Rakhine and Chin states, controls almost all of Rakhine State and about 40% of Chin State. High-level talks advanced stra- tegic cooperation concerning critical minerals and heavy rare earth elements (HREEs).
This is a crucial pivot for India to secure tech supply chains independent of China. Rakhine State and its maritime ports is viewed more as a potential export and transit corridor from the landlocked Kachin mines, but transporting REEs requires massive infrastruc- ture investments (logistical, financial, and reputational risks) through rugged, active war zones
In conclusion, to expect the situation to normalize anytime in the near future would be naïve, not only because of the magnitude of rebel forces in Myanmar, but also the geopolitical power play in the region. Finally, the question is will the India-Myanmar relationship be allowed to grow in the manner both countries want, including successful completion and operationalizing of the KMTTP and the IMT Trilateral Highway, or will this be hostage to the US-China geopolitical rivalry in the region?