The price of a vote : How debt drives Manipur’s money clections

    07-Jun-2026
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YENNING
It is not corruption. It is survival.
In Manipur, debt makes voting transactional. Cash relief matters more than manifestos. A farmer in a remote Constituency does not vote for a party or a pledge. They vote for the candidate who can give them immediate cash. That cash is the difference between managing their debt and being crushed by it.
This is not the voter’s failure. This is the failure of a system that has left its people with no other option.
The Debt Trap in Rural Manipur
NABARD’s “All India Rural Financial Inclusion Survey (NAFIS)” is conducted every five years. It clearly shows the imbalance. In 2016–17, Manipur’s rural families earned between Rs 8,500 and Rs 9,000 per month while spending nearly Rs 8,000. By 2021–22, incomes rose to around Rs 9,500–Rs 10,000, but expenditure climbed just as fast. Adjusted for rural inflation, which averaged roughly 28 percent over this period, real incomes actually declined. Savings were negligible. Families borrowed not for growth, but for survival.
More than half of rural households carried debt. Nearly 70 percent of this borrowing came from informal sources : moneylenders, traders and relatives. Interest rates ranged from 36 to 120 percent annually. About 40 percent of loans went to food and daily consumption, 20 percent to health, 15 percent to education, and only a quarter to agriculture. Debt was a lifeline, not a ladder.
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) data paints the other half of the picture. In 2023–24, scheduled commercial banks in Manipur reported outstanding credit of about Rs 7,500 crore against deposits of Rs 12,000 crore. The credit-deposit ratio, at 62 percent, lagged behind the National average of 75–80 percent. Agricultural lending accounted for only a quarter of total credit.
Personal loans, often used for consumption, were rising. Regional Rural Banks showed similar patterns. Formal institutions existed, but their reach was shallow.
Together, NABARD and RBI data reveal the anatomy of the debt trap. NABARD reports that households are borrowing heavily from informal sources to meet basic needs. RBI shows limited formal credit flows. The gap is filled by moneylenders, whose crippling interest rates perpetuate poverty. Families borrow not to expand farms or businesses, but to buy rice, pay for medicine and send children to school.
Where Banks Are Absent: Illustrations
Why don’t people go to a bank ? Because often there is no bank to go to. Entire Constituencies lack a single formal branch.
Consider Pherzawl district. Carved out of Churachandpur in 2016, it is one of Manipur’s most isolated regions. In February 2026, the State Bank of India (SBI) opened its first-ever branch in the district, in Parbung.
Residents had previously been forced to travel long distances to access basic financial services. A banking facility in the 21st century should not be a historic milestone. The new branch in Parbung is exactly that, because the gap had been so deep for so long.
This is not an isolated story. In February 2025, SBI opened its first-ever branch in the Khundrakpam Assembly Constituency in Imphal East district. The Pangei branch is the 63rd SBI branch in the State, but it was the first to serve the people of Khundrakpam. A month later, in March 2025, the first SBI branch was opened in the Saikul Assembly Constituency in Kangpokpi district, located approximately 22 kilometres from the district headquarters. It is only the fifth SBI branch in the entire Kangpokpi district. The fact that these openings are celebrated as achievements supports the argument that significant parts of rural Manipur remain underserved by formal banking.
In the Andro Assembly Constituency, areas under the Andro Municipality Council and Andro Panchayat do not have a single bank branch. Residents have to travel to the nearest town, Yairipok, about three kilometres away, for banking services.
The problem has been acknowledged at the highest levels. In May 2025, at the 82nd State Level Bankers’ Committee (SLBC) meeting, the Chief Secretary of Manipur emphasised the need to open bank branches in all unbanked blocks. The Secretary of the Department of Financial Services gave strict directions to senior bank officials to extend every possible help.
Where banking is absent, political money fills the void.
Khetrigao is a semi-urban Constituency in Imphal East with nearly 40,000 voters. It has no full-service Nationalised bank branch. The closest formal institution is a post office that offers savings schemes and money transfers, but not agricultural loans, business credit or emergency working capital. Residents, therefore, depend on banking facilities in neighbouring towns.
This financial vacuum creates conditions in which individuals with access to liquid capital may acquire outsized economic influence. According to an analysis by the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) of the 2017 election, one candidate declared assets of approximately Rs 98.6 lakh with no major liabilities. In contexts where formal credit is scarce, such wealth can serve as an important source of emergency financing. While systematic data on politicians acting as informal creditors in Khetrigao would require a dedicated field investigation, the structural conditions strongly suggest that relationships of economic dependence often emerge around those who control access to capital where formal financial institutions are weak.
The Electoral Marketplace and the Voter’s Rational Choice
Banking exclusion is only one part of the story. Ethnic bloc voting, weak party structures, high unemployment and entrenched patron-client relationships also reinforce the dominance of money. National campaign finance practices, where spending limits are frequently breached, reinforce a culture of cash-based politics that filters down to the State.
However, financial exclusion is the most overlooked and arguably the most actionable factor.
A bank branch can be opened. A debt refinancing scheme can be designed. Ethnic loyalties and clientelism are harder to change. The argument is not that banking is the sole cause, but that it is a necessary and neglected piece of the puzzle.
Into the void step the candidates. An ADR analysis of the 2022 Manipur Assembly elections found that 91 of 173 candidates (53 percent) were crorepatis (assets over Rs 1 crore).
The report stated: “The role of money power in our elections is evident from the fact that all major political parties give tickets to wealthy candidates.” Among major parties, 78 percent of candidates from the National People’s Party, 71 percent from the BJP, and 51 percent from the Congress declared assets over Rs 1 crore.
The Election Commission designated six Constituencies as “expenditure-sensitive”, a formal classification indicating a high risk of money power influencing voters. These Constituencies are : Andro, Wangoi, Mayang Imphal, Thanga, Lilong and Churachandpur (ST).
Given this reality, a voter’s behaviour is not a moral failing. It is a rational economic strategy.
You are one of the many rural households already burdened by debt. Your nearest bank branch may be a day’s journey away, if it exists at all. Your primary creditor is often an informal moneylender. Meanwhile, the candidate promising immediate cash relief is standing right in front of you. In such circumstances, the choice is not between integrity and corruption. It is between survival and deeper debt. To blame the people is to miss the point entirely.
System in Crisis, and How to Fix It
The rot goes deeper than election-day cash. The Comptroller and Auditor General’s 2024 audit for Manipur found Rs 13,984 crore in unaccounted funds across 5,595 outstanding Utilisation Certificates, some dating back to 2003. The failure to produce these certificates for years indicates a profound breakdown in accountability. Enormous sums meant for roads, schools and hospitals have vanished into an opaque system, the same system that tolerates electoral patronage.
That breakdown demands a structural response. The solution is not moral outrage. It is a structural reform.
1. Guarantee access to banking services within five kilometres through a combination of branches, banking correspondents and digital service centres. Make the recent SLBC commitment a binding, time-bound mandate with penalties for non-compliance.
2. Establish a Rural Credit and Debt Relief Commission to map household debt by constituency and refinance high-interest informal debt into low-interest formal credit. This is not a loan waiver but a debt swap.
3. Before campaigning begins, the Election Commission should certify each Constituency on its banking status. Banking-deficit Constituencies should require candidates to host financial inclusion camps that link voters to Kisan Credit Cards, microloans and savings accounts.
4. Expand the Manipur State Co-operative Bank network, which has already extended Rs 17 crore in collateral-free credit to 1,195 women’s self-help groups. Cooperative banks are uniquely positioned to break the moneylender’s stranglehold.
5. Enforce Utilisation Certificate requirements strictly. For Government officials and department heads who persistently fail to submit UCs, criminal penalties under the Prevention of Corruption Act or appropriate financial rules should apply. For elected representatives or contractors found complicit in the diversion of funds, immediate disqualification and prosecution should follow.
Conclusion
The evidence from Manipur strongly suggests a recurring pattern: where banks are absent, political money fills the void. No local bank. Wealthy candidates with liquid capital. Voters with no real alternative.
This is not a story about corrupt individuals. It is about a failed system. Until systemic restructuring occurs, elections in Manipur will remain transactional, driven not by choice but by debt.