Border Flames : CoBRA’s arrival amid a crisis of trust in Kamjong
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YENNING
The hills of Kamjong district have long been a frontier of uncertainty. The Indo-Myanmar border cuts through dense forests and scattered tribal villages. In late June and early July 2026, that uncertainty erupted into a fresh wave of violence. Phaimol, a Kuki village, together with Kongkan Thana, Shangkalok, Huimin Thana and Kherongram, all Tangkhul Naga settlements, were struck by arson within the space of a few days. Dozens of houses and refugee shelters were reduced to ashes.
Unlike a conventional cross-border raid, the attacks have produced no agreed account of who was responsible. Kuki and Naga organisations blame each other. At the time of writing, none of the allegations had been independently verified. The destruction is undisputed.
Responsibility remains fiercely contested.
Phaimol lies about forty-five kilometres northeast of Chassad Police Station, close to Indo-Myanmar border pillar number 113. On 1 July, about fifteen houses were burnt, according to official estimates. Police said the village had been evacuated several weeks earlier due to the deteriorating security situation. Residents had taken shelter at Aishi village under the protection of an Assam Rifles post. No casualties were reported.
The Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), the apex Kuki organisation in the State, alleged that cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), commonly known as NSCN-IM, acted with the Myanmar-based Shanni Nationalities Army. According to KIM, they crossed the border before dawn and set the village ablaze. KIM also claimed that the Assam Rifles post responsible for the area had reportedly been vacated only a day before the incident. It called for a transparent inquiry into the timing of the withdrawal.
A parallel set of allegations emerged the same day from the Naga side. The Naga Village Guard (NVG) alleged that around twenty armed men, identified as Kuki militants collaborating with the Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B), crossed the Namya River from Phaikoh village near border pillar number 102. According to the NVG, they torched seven houses at Huimin Thana and thirteen at Kherongram, a hamlet of Nampisha village.
The NVG further alleged that twenty temporary shelters at Kherongram were also destroyed. The shelters were built in 2023 to accommodate 365 refugees displaced by unrest in Myanmar. The fires left those families homeless once again. Near Kongkan Police Station, barely three kilometres from an Assam Rifles camp, twelve houses and the local market were also reportedly burnt. Naga organisations attributed these attacks to the same militant network.
The two accounts differ sharply over who is responsible. Yet both communities agree that the destruction was extensive: more than thirty houses, together with refugee shelters, across the affected villages. Nor was this the first such incident in the region. Earlier in May, Tangkhul villages, including Namlee, Wanglee and Z Choro, also in the Kamjong border belt, were attacked and burnt allegedly by KNA-B. Local MLA Leishiyo Keishing cited those incidents as evidence of a recurring pattern rather than isolated episodes.
Background
These incidents form part of a wider cycle of violence that has engulfed Manipur since May 2023. Clashes between Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities have claimed more than two hundred and sixty lives and displaced tens of thousands of people. During the past year, the conflict has increasingly drawn in a third community: the Nagas. This followed the abduction and killing of six Naga civilians from Leilon Vaiphei village in Kangpokpi district, whose dismembered bodies were recovered in June. The killings hardened public sentiment within Naga communities, and appear to have intensified the cycle of reprisals now unfolding in Kamjong’s border villages.
Two Forces, Two Mandates
Manipur’s security architecture rests on two Central paramilitary forces, each with distinct mandates and capabilities.
The Assam Rifles, widely known as the “Sentinels of the North East”, has for decades been responsible for border security, area domination, and counter-insurgency operations in coordination with the Indian Army. It maintains posts across sensitive districts, including Kamjong, Churachandpur and Tengnoupal.
The Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), by contrast, is a specialised unit of the Central Reserve Police Force, raised in 2009 primarily for anti-Naxal operations in central India. This year marked its first deployment in Manipur and in the North East as a whole. On 31 May, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs approved the deployment of two full battalions to the State.
Central Reserve Police Force Director General GP Singh personally oversaw the induction.
Each battalion comprises about one thousand personnel. By early June, at least three companies had reached Imphal and begun a forty-five-day pre-induction course, a schedule reportedly accelerated to have units operational before the monsoon.
CoBRA’s role in Manipur differs from that of the Assam Rifles. Its primary mission is de- weaponisation, intelligence-led operations and precision raids against armed groups, while the Assam Rifles continues to focus on border management, area domination and broader counter-insurgency responsibilities. The two forces, therefore, perform complementary rather than identical roles.
That distinction became evident in mid-June, when CoBRA units, operating alongside the Assam Rifles, conducted coordinated search operations in Leilon Vaiphei, Leilon Khunou, L Munlui and Konsakhul villages in Kangpokpi district, recovering firearms and ammunition and dismantling several bunkers. Community responses were mixed.
The Foothills Naga Coordination Committee criticised the withdrawal of an operation on 21 June at Leilon Vaiphei, alleging that militants who had reportedly been surrounded were allowed to escape towards camps of the Kuki National Front (Peace), or KNF-P.
The Kuki-Zo Council offered a different criticism, alleging that operations at Leilon Vaiphei and the Ebenezer camp were conducted without adequate coordination with groups operating under the Suspension of Operations agreement, and that enforcement had disproportionately targeted Kuki-Zo areas following the killing of the six Naga civilians, while attacks on Kuki-Zo villages received a slower response.
These contrasting criticisms illustrate a broader problem. Security actions are now judged as much by community perception as by operational outcomes.
Trust in Short Supply
The fires in Kamjong have intensified an already difficult debate about the credibility of the Assam Rifles. KIM claimed that the post near Phaimol was vacated a day before the village was burnt. Police, meanwhile, reported that Phaimol had been evacuated weeks earlier due to the deteriorating security situation. The contradiction remains unresolved. Leishiyo Keishing, the MLA representing Phungyar Constituency, which includes much of the affected border region, raised similar concerns. He pointed out that Kongkan Thana lies barely three kilometres from an Assam Rifles camp, and questioned how such an attack could occur “right under the nose” of the security forces. He also urged the State Government to consider deploying the India Reserve Battalion (IRB), describing it as a more neutral force in the eyes of local residents.
The loss of confidence extends beyond one community. Kuki organisations argue that the Assam Rifles failed to prevent attacks on Kuki villages, and that operations became more assertive in Kuki-Zo areas only after the killing of the Naga civilians. Naga organisations counter that repeated attacks on Tangkhul settlements have not received an adequate response, and call for quicker intervention and greater accountability.
Both communities have therefore called for additional security forces, including the Border Security Force, the India Reserve Battalion, and additional CoBRA companies. The debate, therefore, extends beyond a handful of villages: it has become a question of institutional credibility.
A Fragile Calculus
The deployment of CoBRA marks a significant shift in India’s security response to the crisis in Manipur. It reflects an acknowledgement that conven- tional security deployments alone have struggled to prevent armed groups from regrouping in the State’s hill districts, and its jungle warfare and intelligence-led capabilities may improve the State’s ability to disrupt militant networks and recover illegal weapons.
Yet the challenge in Kamjong extends beyond armed operations. Security forces can dismantle bunkers and seize weapons. They cannot, by themselves, restore confidence between communities that increasingly question the impartiality of the institutions meant to protect them.
The fires in Kamjong illustrate this dilemma. Whatever future investigations conclude, the pattern is familiar: a village is attacked, competing allegations quickly emerge, each community presents itself as the victim, and calls for impartial investigations follow, often slowly and rarely to the satisfaction of all sides. Each disputed incident deepens suspicion.
Each delayed investigation reinforces competing narratives, so that even tactically successful operations risk being viewed through the lens of community affiliation rather than professional conduct.
Restoring public confidence will require more than additional deployments. De-weaponisation and sustained intelligence operations remain essential. They must be matched by credible, transparent, and visibly impartial investigations into every major incident.
Political engagement matters equally. The grievances of the Naga, Kuki and Meitei communities cannot be addressed solely through security measures. Durable peace will require dialogue that recognises their competing concerns while strengthening the institutions meant to serve them all.
The arrival of CoBRA may strengthen the State’s operational capacity. Whether it also strengthens public confidence will depend on how fairly and consistently security institutions respond in the months ahead. Until accountability commands greater confidence than competing narratives, the fires that periodically consume Manipur’s border villages are likely to outlast the deployment of any single security force.
The hills of Kamjong district have long been a frontier of uncertainty. The Indo-Myanmar border cuts through dense forests and scattered tribal villages. In late June and early July 2026, that uncertainty erupted into a fresh wave of violence. Phaimol, a Kuki village, together with Kongkan Thana, Shangkalok, Huimin Thana and Kherongram, all Tangkhul Naga settlements, were struck by arson within the space of a few days. Dozens of houses and refugee shelters were reduced to ashes.
Unlike a conventional cross-border raid, the attacks have produced no agreed account of who was responsible. Kuki and Naga organisations blame each other. At the time of writing, none of the allegations had been independently verified. The destruction is undisputed.
Responsibility remains fiercely contested.
Phaimol lies about forty-five kilometres northeast of Chassad Police Station, close to Indo-Myanmar border pillar number 113. On 1 July, about fifteen houses were burnt, according to official estimates. Police said the village had been evacuated several weeks earlier due to the deteriorating security situation. Residents had taken shelter at Aishi village under the protection of an Assam Rifles post. No casualties were reported.
The Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), the apex Kuki organisation in the State, alleged that cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), commonly known as NSCN-IM, acted with the Myanmar-based Shanni Nationalities Army. According to KIM, they crossed the border before dawn and set the village ablaze. KIM also claimed that the Assam Rifles post responsible for the area had reportedly been vacated only a day before the incident. It called for a transparent inquiry into the timing of the withdrawal.
A parallel set of allegations emerged the same day from the Naga side. The Naga Village Guard (NVG) alleged that around twenty armed men, identified as Kuki militants collaborating with the Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B), crossed the Namya River from Phaikoh village near border pillar number 102. According to the NVG, they torched seven houses at Huimin Thana and thirteen at Kherongram, a hamlet of Nampisha village.
The NVG further alleged that twenty temporary shelters at Kherongram were also destroyed. The shelters were built in 2023 to accommodate 365 refugees displaced by unrest in Myanmar. The fires left those families homeless once again. Near Kongkan Police Station, barely three kilometres from an Assam Rifles camp, twelve houses and the local market were also reportedly burnt. Naga organisations attributed these attacks to the same militant network.
The two accounts differ sharply over who is responsible. Yet both communities agree that the destruction was extensive: more than thirty houses, together with refugee shelters, across the affected villages. Nor was this the first such incident in the region. Earlier in May, Tangkhul villages, including Namlee, Wanglee and Z Choro, also in the Kamjong border belt, were attacked and burnt allegedly by KNA-B. Local MLA Leishiyo Keishing cited those incidents as evidence of a recurring pattern rather than isolated episodes.
Background
These incidents form part of a wider cycle of violence that has engulfed Manipur since May 2023. Clashes between Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities have claimed more than two hundred and sixty lives and displaced tens of thousands of people. During the past year, the conflict has increasingly drawn in a third community: the Nagas. This followed the abduction and killing of six Naga civilians from Leilon Vaiphei village in Kangpokpi district, whose dismembered bodies were recovered in June. The killings hardened public sentiment within Naga communities, and appear to have intensified the cycle of reprisals now unfolding in Kamjong’s border villages.
Two Forces, Two Mandates
Manipur’s security architecture rests on two Central paramilitary forces, each with distinct mandates and capabilities.
The Assam Rifles, widely known as the “Sentinels of the North East”, has for decades been responsible for border security, area domination, and counter-insurgency operations in coordination with the Indian Army. It maintains posts across sensitive districts, including Kamjong, Churachandpur and Tengnoupal.
The Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), by contrast, is a specialised unit of the Central Reserve Police Force, raised in 2009 primarily for anti-Naxal operations in central India. This year marked its first deployment in Manipur and in the North East as a whole. On 31 May, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs approved the deployment of two full battalions to the State.
Central Reserve Police Force Director General GP Singh personally oversaw the induction.
Each battalion comprises about one thousand personnel. By early June, at least three companies had reached Imphal and begun a forty-five-day pre-induction course, a schedule reportedly accelerated to have units operational before the monsoon.
CoBRA’s role in Manipur differs from that of the Assam Rifles. Its primary mission is de- weaponisation, intelligence-led operations and precision raids against armed groups, while the Assam Rifles continues to focus on border management, area domination and broader counter-insurgency responsibilities. The two forces, therefore, perform complementary rather than identical roles.
That distinction became evident in mid-June, when CoBRA units, operating alongside the Assam Rifles, conducted coordinated search operations in Leilon Vaiphei, Leilon Khunou, L Munlui and Konsakhul villages in Kangpokpi district, recovering firearms and ammunition and dismantling several bunkers. Community responses were mixed.
The Foothills Naga Coordination Committee criticised the withdrawal of an operation on 21 June at Leilon Vaiphei, alleging that militants who had reportedly been surrounded were allowed to escape towards camps of the Kuki National Front (Peace), or KNF-P.
The Kuki-Zo Council offered a different criticism, alleging that operations at Leilon Vaiphei and the Ebenezer camp were conducted without adequate coordination with groups operating under the Suspension of Operations agreement, and that enforcement had disproportionately targeted Kuki-Zo areas following the killing of the six Naga civilians, while attacks on Kuki-Zo villages received a slower response.
These contrasting criticisms illustrate a broader problem. Security actions are now judged as much by community perception as by operational outcomes.
Trust in Short Supply
The fires in Kamjong have intensified an already difficult debate about the credibility of the Assam Rifles. KIM claimed that the post near Phaimol was vacated a day before the village was burnt. Police, meanwhile, reported that Phaimol had been evacuated weeks earlier due to the deteriorating security situation. The contradiction remains unresolved. Leishiyo Keishing, the MLA representing Phungyar Constituency, which includes much of the affected border region, raised similar concerns. He pointed out that Kongkan Thana lies barely three kilometres from an Assam Rifles camp, and questioned how such an attack could occur “right under the nose” of the security forces. He also urged the State Government to consider deploying the India Reserve Battalion (IRB), describing it as a more neutral force in the eyes of local residents.
The loss of confidence extends beyond one community. Kuki organisations argue that the Assam Rifles failed to prevent attacks on Kuki villages, and that operations became more assertive in Kuki-Zo areas only after the killing of the Naga civilians. Naga organisations counter that repeated attacks on Tangkhul settlements have not received an adequate response, and call for quicker intervention and greater accountability.
Both communities have therefore called for additional security forces, including the Border Security Force, the India Reserve Battalion, and additional CoBRA companies. The debate, therefore, extends beyond a handful of villages: it has become a question of institutional credibility.
A Fragile Calculus
The deployment of CoBRA marks a significant shift in India’s security response to the crisis in Manipur. It reflects an acknowledgement that conven- tional security deployments alone have struggled to prevent armed groups from regrouping in the State’s hill districts, and its jungle warfare and intelligence-led capabilities may improve the State’s ability to disrupt militant networks and recover illegal weapons.
Yet the challenge in Kamjong extends beyond armed operations. Security forces can dismantle bunkers and seize weapons. They cannot, by themselves, restore confidence between communities that increasingly question the impartiality of the institutions meant to protect them.
The fires in Kamjong illustrate this dilemma. Whatever future investigations conclude, the pattern is familiar: a village is attacked, competing allegations quickly emerge, each community presents itself as the victim, and calls for impartial investigations follow, often slowly and rarely to the satisfaction of all sides. Each disputed incident deepens suspicion.
Each delayed investigation reinforces competing narratives, so that even tactically successful operations risk being viewed through the lens of community affiliation rather than professional conduct.
Restoring public confidence will require more than additional deployments. De-weaponisation and sustained intelligence operations remain essential. They must be matched by credible, transparent, and visibly impartial investigations into every major incident.
Political engagement matters equally. The grievances of the Naga, Kuki and Meitei communities cannot be addressed solely through security measures. Durable peace will require dialogue that recognises their competing concerns while strengthening the institutions meant to serve them all.
The arrival of CoBRA may strengthen the State’s operational capacity. Whether it also strengthens public confidence will depend on how fairly and consistently security institutions respond in the months ahead. Until accountability commands greater confidence than competing narratives, the fires that periodically consume Manipur’s border villages are likely to outlast the deployment of any single security force.