Kabaw Valley: A forgotten betrayal or a closed chapter ?

Dr Raj Singh
Contd from previous issue
Meanwhile, legal scholars and Myanmar-focused analysts highlight the impossibility of reversing nearly two centuries of recognized sovereignty. The legitimacy of reclaiming Kabaw Valley is thus largely political, not legal – it hinges on sentiments of historical justice rather than enforceable rights. And politically, most experts agree, the prospect of Myanmar ever returning Kabaw to Manipur is extremely slim under present circumstances.
Current Perspectives: Official Stances of India, Myanmar, and Manipur
In contemporary times, the Kabaw Valley issue surfaces mainly in local and academic discussions rather than as a serious point on diplomatic agendas. The official positions of the relevant parties can be summarized as follows:
Government of India : New Delhi’s official stance is that there is no outstanding territorial dispute with Myanmar. The Indo-Myanmar boundary is accepted as per the 1970s demarcation, and Kabaw Valley is recognized as part of Myanmar. In practice, the Indian Government has not pursued any claim or negotiation regarding Kabaw Valley’s return. This is evidenced by the silence (or polite deflection) from the Ministry of External Affairs whenever the issue is raised.
For instance, when an MP from Manipur (Dr RK Ranjan) raised Kabaw’s status with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in 2020, the Minister merely asked for a written note and did not commit to any action. No follow-up indicating a policy change was ever announced. The Indian Government is well aware of Manipuri sentiments, but its priority is maintaining cordial relations with Myanmar and upholding international agreements. Officials often point out that Manipur had no jurisdiction over Kabaw at independence, implying India cannot seek to “take back” an area it never ruled.
Also, given that India values stability and its international image, it avoids any rhetoric that might liken its approach to that of expansionist claims (India often contrasts itself with China’s aggressive territorial claims, so it treads carefully). In short, India’s contemporary official position is to respect the status quo. Even with a more Nationalist Government at the Center in recent years, there has been no indication of revisiting Kabaw at the official level–showing a bipartisan continuity in foreign policy on this matter.
Government of Myanmar : From Myanmar’s perspective, Kabaw Valley is an integral part of its Sagaing Region, and there is no “issue” to discuss. The Myanmar Government (whether the past elected Governments or the current military junta) has never acknowledged any Indian claim because none has been formally made in modern times. In public discourse, Myanmar might only mention Kabaw in a historical context (eg, school textbooks or historical essays noting the British annexation and return of Kabaw). If pressed, Myanmar’s likely stance would be straightforward: the boundary was settled by treaty and by the 1967/1975 demarcation, and Kabaw is indisputably Myanmar’s. Given Myanmar’s internal conflicts and its focus on border stability, it would view any Indian attempt to revisit the Kabaw question as unfriendly at best or even an act of aggression. It is important to note that at present, Myanmar’s regime relies on diplomatic support from neighbors like India to navigate international isolation. So far, India has given Myanmar no reason for concern on the border. If that changed, Myanmar could react by internationalizing the issue or seeking stronger backing from China and ASEAN against Indian “pressure.” However, this scenario remains hypothetical – Myanmar and India continue to treat their boundary as settled. On the practical front, Myanmar administers the Kabaw area (including places like Tamu, Khampat, Kale) with no interference. There is also no significant secessionist movement in Kabaw that seeks reunification with Manipur/India; thus, Myanmar faces no internal push that could synergize with Manipur’s claim.
State of Manipur (Local Perspective) : In Manipur itself, the Kabaw Valley issue remains a sensitive and emotive topic, resurfacing from time to time in political and civil society forums.
The Manipur State Government’s official position is constrained – foreign policy is outside its purview, so it cannot make any formal claim. However, State-level politicians often take stances on the issue to satisfy local sentiment. Recently, the titular King of Manipur, who is now a Member of Parliament, has been an outspoken voice demanding justice over Kabaw. In March 2025, he urged the Indian Government in Parliament to either negotiate Kabaw’s return or at least ensure Myanmar resumes the compensation payments as per the 1834 agreement.
This reflects a sentiment among sections of Manipuris that something should be done – if not reacquisition, then possibly revival of the tribute or other acknowledgment of Manipur’s historical right. On the other hand, not all Manipuri leaders agree on the narrative. The local unit of the Indian National Congress, for example, refuted the MP’s claim that Nehru “gave away” the valley, pointing out the historical facts and cautioning against misleading people.
This indicates a divide where some see the issue as a rallying cry for regional pride (often tied with a critique of past Indian leaders), while others prefer to lay it to rest to avoid stoking false hopes or communal tensions.
Among the Manipuri public and intellectuals, contemporary perspectives vary:
Older generation and Royals: The older generations, including members of Manipur’s former royal family, tend to keep alive the memory of Kabaw Valley as “lost homeland.”
They commemorate historical grievances and often lobby the Central Government, albeit symbolically. For them, Kabaw is part of Manipur’s identity, cut off unjustly.
Youth and Pragmatists: Many younger Manipuris and realists acknowledge that while Kabaw’s history is painful, practical unity with Myanmar is not feasible now. They focus on current issues within Manipur and India, though they might support demands for the historical record to be recognized (e.g., adding Kabaw’s story to educational curricula or seeking some cultural exchange with the people of Kabaw).
Compensation Advocates: A segment of people (like MP Sanajaoba) suggest that if territory cannot be regained, financial compensation should continue – essentially urging India to ask Myanmar to pay the present-value equivalent of the old ?500 stipend. (By some calculations, adjusting for inflation and economic changes, that sum would be enormous today – one estimate put it at over Rs 8,000 crore total arrears)
However, there is no indication Myanmar would ever agree to restart such payments, and India has not pursued this diplomatically. It remains a rhetorical point to highlight the value of what Manipur lost.
Contemporary Geopolitics and Regional Tensions: In the current environment, there are additional factors to consider. Myanmar has been undergoing severe internal strife since the 2021 coup – large parts of the Sagaing Region (which includes Kabaw Valley) are embroiled in conflict between the junta and local resistance forces. This has spilled over humanitarian issues, with refugees from Myanmar (especially Chin and Sagaing areas) fleeing into Manipur and Mizoram. Manipur itself faced ethnic violence in 2023, which had indirect linkages to cross-border ethnic dynamics. These pressing issues mean that any talk of redrawing borders is even more unwelcome. India is trying to stabilize its Northeast and assist (quietly) in humanitarian relief for Myanmar’s border regions; it would not want to complicate matters by introducing a sovereignty dispute. Likewise, Myanmar’s embattled Government is preoccupied with domestic rebellions and would react sharply to any external claim on its territory. Both Nations, along with other neighbors, are more concerned with issues like managing refugees, combatting drug trafficking across the border, and maintaining peace in borderlands, than with revisiting old treaties. The focus is on cooperation – for example, India and Myanmar have discussed upgrading border trade infrastructure and even a bus service between Imphal (Manipur) and Mandalay to improve people-to-people contact.
These forward-looking initiatives implicitly require mutual recognition of the border as-is.
To summarize the current official perspectives
The Union of India acknowledges Kabaw Valley as part of Myanmar and has shown no intent to challenge that, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar considers the matter closed and non-negotiable, and the State of Manipur continues to remember Kabaw as a lost part of its heritage, though it lacks any power to change the situation. Contemporary geopolitics – including the need for India-Myanmar cooperation and the volatile regional context – reinforce the reality that the Kabaw Valley issue remains a historical lament rather than an active claim in interstate relations.
Conclusion
The claim that Myanmar (Burma) should return Kabaw Valley to Manipur is rooted in a deep historical wound but is confronted by hard legal and political realities. Historically, Kabaw Valley was indeed once under Manipur’s dominion and was only separated due to 19th-century power politics – the Treaty of Yandabo (1826) ended Burmese control over Manipur, and the 1834 agreement brokered by the British sealed Kabaw’s fate as part of Burma, with monetary compensation to assuage Manipur.
These events occurred nearly 200 years ago, yet their legacy lives on in Manipuri collective memory. After India’s independence, decisions by New Delhi – particularly the 1953 understanding to halt compensation – further alienated Manipuris, who felt their interests were sidelined.
However, when viewed through the lens of treaties, legal agreements, and international norms, the case for reclaiming Kabaw Valley is extremely weak. Modern State borders are not easily undone by historical arguments; the principles of state succession and uti possidetis have entrenched the 1834 boundary as the legitimate one.
India’s conduct since 1947 has consistently recognized Myanmar’s sovereignty over the area, making any sudden reversal legally indefensible. No international mechanism would likely support India in reclaiming Kabaw without Myanmar’s consent – and Myanmar has no incentive or obligation to consent. On the contrary, Myanmar regards Kabaw as its lawful territory and any suggestion otherwise as a non-starter.
Moreover, Indo-Burmese political relations highlight why both countries have moved forward without reopening this chapter. Their cooperation on security and economic fronts and the mutual interest in a stable border far outweigh any benefit India might seek from a revision of borders. Strategic imperatives – from counter-insurgency to balancing China–counsel maintaining the friendship and trust between New Delhi and Nay Pyi Taw, not undermining it with territorial wrangles. Indeed, when India and Myanmar formalized their boundary in the 1960s, it was precisely to put such disputes to rest and focus on future collaboration. To be contd