The road to peace in Manipur travels through Myanmar's Chin province
|
Jaideep Mazumdar
Lasting peace in Manipur is unlikely as long as Chin militants from Myanmar continue crossing over and taking refuge. Their presence remains the biggest hurdle to stability, say security experts.
A tenuous peace, threatened occasionally by abductions and killings, has settled over Manipur that had been wracked by ethnic strife since May 2023.
But the distinct reduction in the scale of violence witnessed for the better part of 2023 and early 2024 has not paved the path for return to normalcy as yet.
The ethnic divide, and mistrust, between the Meities and Kukis, and even the Kukis and Nagas, still exists.
Talks between representatives of the Meitei and Kuki communities that are being brokered by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) have gotten off to a nebulous start, but it will take a long time for the two communities to bury the hatchet and smoke the peace pipe.
However, lasting peace in Manipur will remain a chimera till Kuki-Chin militants, especially the ones from the Chin State of neighbouring Myanmar, lay down arms or leave Manipur.
And that can only happen once the Chin militants in Myanmar score a decisive victory over the ruling junta and take full and total control of the Chin State.
That is why, say MHA officials and security experts, the road to peace in Manipur winds through Myanmar’s hilly and densely forested Chin State.
As long as the Chin State remains unsettled with the militants there waging bruising battles with junta forces, there is unlikely to be lasting peace in Manipur.
That’s because, say security experts, the Chin militants from Myanmar will continue to enter and take refuge in Manipur. And their presence in Manipur is the biggest hurdle to the return of peace in the trouble-torn North Eastern State.
“The well-armed and well-trained militants from Chin State are not only taking refuge in Manipur, but have also been training and arming the Kuki militants in the State. The militants from across the border have even actively participated in attacks on Meiteis by Kuki militants,” said retired Brigadier SK Sharma who had served in Manipur.
The Kukis and Chins share very close ethnic ties and are, along with the Mizos and other smaller tribes, part of the larger Zo ethnic family.
Why armed offensive against Chin-Kuki militants will be counterproductive
The obvious question that arises is why the tens of thousands of troops of the army, Assam Rifles, Central Armed Police Forces like the CRPF and BSF, and the Manipur police, have not been tasked with carrying out full scale counter-insurgency (CI) operations against the Chin and Kuki militants.
The answer is simple : such operations will trigger angry reactions in Mizoram and alienate the people of that State, and also cost India the goodwill of the Chins in Myanmar.
Mizoram had witnessed a two-decade-long fierce insurgency from 1966, and the Union Government rightly feels that it will be very unwise to roil the sensitive border State.
“Mizoram is a very sensitive State and Mizos are very touchy about their ethnic ties with the Chins and Kukis. It would be imprudent to anger them by launching operations against Kuki and Chin militants,” a senior MHA official told Swarajya.
Moreover, the strategic balance that India is maintaining in Myanmar--having ties with both the junta and the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and other resistance forces that are battling the junta in that country--would be affected if CI operations were to be launched against the Kuki and Chin militants in Manipur.
“We have good ties with the Chin resistance forces and the Arakan Army. That provides us a lot of strategic depth in Myanmar. Operations against Chin resistance forces who have taken shelter in Manipur will be counter-productive. We cannot alienate the Chin forces because that will erode our influence in Myanmar and will also jeopardise major projects like the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project,” a senior official of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) told Swarajya.
The Kaladan project involves transporting cargo by sea to the Sittwe port (in Rakhine province), and from there up the Kaladan river to Paletwa (Chin province) from where the cargo will be transported by road to Zorinpui, the entry point to Mizoram.
This ambitious project, which will reduce time and cost for transportation of cargo, including heavy machinery, to the eastern part of the landlocked North Eastern region, has been held up due to fighting between the Myanmarese resistance forces and the junta forces.
The Arakan Army (AA) has captured almost the entire Rakhine province except the Sittwe and Kyaukphyu ports. Paletwa is under AA’s firm control while the territory through which the road from Paletwa to Zorinpui in Mizoram passes is being held by the Chin resistance forces.
The Chin resistance forces have captured and displaced junta forces from major parts of the Chin State. The junta forces are now present only in Chin capital Hakha, as well as Thantlang and Tedim townships.
“It could only be a matter of time before the Chin forces and the Arakan Army gain full control of their respective States. And ultimately, these two States are most likely to become autonomous provinces in a loose federation of provinces that Myanmar seems to be headed to,” Thitinan Pongsudhirak, senior fellow at Thailand’s Institute of Security & International Studies (ISIS) told Swarajya from Bangkok.
If this assessment comes true, India will be dependent on the United League of Arakan (ULA)--the AA is the armed wing of the ULA--as well as the Chin National Council to protect and advance its interests in the two provinces.
Hence, said the MEA official, antagonising the Chin National Council by launching counter-insurgency operations against Chin-Kuki militants in Manipur will be counterproductive for India.
“Due to their close ethnic ties, the Chin and Kuki militants function in close coordination and in an integrated manner in Manipur. It is impossible to launch operations against the Kuki militants, which will definitely result in a lot of bloodshed, without inflicting harm on the Chin militants sheltered in Manipur as well,” explained army veteran Sharma.
Hence, full-scale CI operations against the Chin-Kuki militants in Manipur are unlikely.
Why resolution of armed conflict in Chin is important
Strategic affairs experts say that it will serve India’s interests if the Chin militants operating as the armed wing of the Chin National Council (CNC) score quick victories over the junta forces and gain complete control over the Chin State.
“It does not serve India’s interests if the Chin resistance forces and the junta forces continue to fight each other and uncertainty prevails in the Chin State. Since the junta forces are losing ground rapidly, it is better for us if the Chin forces win and the CNC gains complete control of the entire Chin State,” said a strategic affairs expert with a leading think tank in New Delhi.
It is because of this that New Delhi encouraged Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma to broker peace between the two primary Chin groups--the Chinland Council and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council--and bring about their merger in February this year.
Chief Minister Lalduhoma oversaw the signing of an agreement between leaders of the two anti-junta groups and their merger into the Chin National Council in Aizawl on February 26.
While the CM’s close involvement in brokering the agreement and the merger, as well as the presence of leaders of the anti-junta groups in Aizawl, initially evoked shock and consternation, it is learnt that the Union Government was aware of Lalduhoma’s moves and he had New Delhi’s tacit blessings.
(To be contd)
Lasting peace in Manipur is unlikely as long as Chin militants from Myanmar continue crossing over and taking refuge. Their presence remains the biggest hurdle to stability, say security experts.
A tenuous peace, threatened occasionally by abductions and killings, has settled over Manipur that had been wracked by ethnic strife since May 2023.
But the distinct reduction in the scale of violence witnessed for the better part of 2023 and early 2024 has not paved the path for return to normalcy as yet.
The ethnic divide, and mistrust, between the Meities and Kukis, and even the Kukis and Nagas, still exists.
Talks between representatives of the Meitei and Kuki communities that are being brokered by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) have gotten off to a nebulous start, but it will take a long time for the two communities to bury the hatchet and smoke the peace pipe.
However, lasting peace in Manipur will remain a chimera till Kuki-Chin militants, especially the ones from the Chin State of neighbouring Myanmar, lay down arms or leave Manipur.
And that can only happen once the Chin militants in Myanmar score a decisive victory over the ruling junta and take full and total control of the Chin State.
That is why, say MHA officials and security experts, the road to peace in Manipur winds through Myanmar’s hilly and densely forested Chin State.
As long as the Chin State remains unsettled with the militants there waging bruising battles with junta forces, there is unlikely to be lasting peace in Manipur.
That’s because, say security experts, the Chin militants from Myanmar will continue to enter and take refuge in Manipur. And their presence in Manipur is the biggest hurdle to the return of peace in the trouble-torn North Eastern State.
“The well-armed and well-trained militants from Chin State are not only taking refuge in Manipur, but have also been training and arming the Kuki militants in the State. The militants from across the border have even actively participated in attacks on Meiteis by Kuki militants,” said retired Brigadier SK Sharma who had served in Manipur.
The Kukis and Chins share very close ethnic ties and are, along with the Mizos and other smaller tribes, part of the larger Zo ethnic family.
Why armed offensive against Chin-Kuki militants will be counterproductive
The obvious question that arises is why the tens of thousands of troops of the army, Assam Rifles, Central Armed Police Forces like the CRPF and BSF, and the Manipur police, have not been tasked with carrying out full scale counter-insurgency (CI) operations against the Chin and Kuki militants.
The answer is simple : such operations will trigger angry reactions in Mizoram and alienate the people of that State, and also cost India the goodwill of the Chins in Myanmar.
Mizoram had witnessed a two-decade-long fierce insurgency from 1966, and the Union Government rightly feels that it will be very unwise to roil the sensitive border State.
“Mizoram is a very sensitive State and Mizos are very touchy about their ethnic ties with the Chins and Kukis. It would be imprudent to anger them by launching operations against Kuki and Chin militants,” a senior MHA official told Swarajya.
Moreover, the strategic balance that India is maintaining in Myanmar--having ties with both the junta and the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) and other resistance forces that are battling the junta in that country--would be affected if CI operations were to be launched against the Kuki and Chin militants in Manipur.
“We have good ties with the Chin resistance forces and the Arakan Army. That provides us a lot of strategic depth in Myanmar. Operations against Chin resistance forces who have taken shelter in Manipur will be counter-productive. We cannot alienate the Chin forces because that will erode our influence in Myanmar and will also jeopardise major projects like the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project,” a senior official of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) told Swarajya.
The Kaladan project involves transporting cargo by sea to the Sittwe port (in Rakhine province), and from there up the Kaladan river to Paletwa (Chin province) from where the cargo will be transported by road to Zorinpui, the entry point to Mizoram.
This ambitious project, which will reduce time and cost for transportation of cargo, including heavy machinery, to the eastern part of the landlocked North Eastern region, has been held up due to fighting between the Myanmarese resistance forces and the junta forces.
The Arakan Army (AA) has captured almost the entire Rakhine province except the Sittwe and Kyaukphyu ports. Paletwa is under AA’s firm control while the territory through which the road from Paletwa to Zorinpui in Mizoram passes is being held by the Chin resistance forces.
The Chin resistance forces have captured and displaced junta forces from major parts of the Chin State. The junta forces are now present only in Chin capital Hakha, as well as Thantlang and Tedim townships.
“It could only be a matter of time before the Chin forces and the Arakan Army gain full control of their respective States. And ultimately, these two States are most likely to become autonomous provinces in a loose federation of provinces that Myanmar seems to be headed to,” Thitinan Pongsudhirak, senior fellow at Thailand’s Institute of Security & International Studies (ISIS) told Swarajya from Bangkok.
If this assessment comes true, India will be dependent on the United League of Arakan (ULA)--the AA is the armed wing of the ULA--as well as the Chin National Council to protect and advance its interests in the two provinces.
Hence, said the MEA official, antagonising the Chin National Council by launching counter-insurgency operations against Chin-Kuki militants in Manipur will be counterproductive for India.
“Due to their close ethnic ties, the Chin and Kuki militants function in close coordination and in an integrated manner in Manipur. It is impossible to launch operations against the Kuki militants, which will definitely result in a lot of bloodshed, without inflicting harm on the Chin militants sheltered in Manipur as well,” explained army veteran Sharma.
Hence, full-scale CI operations against the Chin-Kuki militants in Manipur are unlikely.
Why resolution of armed conflict in Chin is important
Strategic affairs experts say that it will serve India’s interests if the Chin militants operating as the armed wing of the Chin National Council (CNC) score quick victories over the junta forces and gain complete control over the Chin State.
“It does not serve India’s interests if the Chin resistance forces and the junta forces continue to fight each other and uncertainty prevails in the Chin State. Since the junta forces are losing ground rapidly, it is better for us if the Chin forces win and the CNC gains complete control of the entire Chin State,” said a strategic affairs expert with a leading think tank in New Delhi.
It is because of this that New Delhi encouraged Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma to broker peace between the two primary Chin groups--the Chinland Council and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council--and bring about their merger in February this year.
Chief Minister Lalduhoma oversaw the signing of an agreement between leaders of the two anti-junta groups and their merger into the Chin National Council in Aizawl on February 26.
While the CM’s close involvement in brokering the agreement and the merger, as well as the presence of leaders of the anti-junta groups in Aizawl, initially evoked shock and consternation, it is learnt that the Union Government was aware of Lalduhoma’s moves and he had New Delhi’s tacit blessings.
(To be contd)