Manipur in the balance: Between fgragile calm and political paralysis
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Dipak Kurmi
In February 2025, the Union Government imposed President’s Rule in Manipur, marking a turning point in the State’s prolonged descent into ethnic violence. The Constitutional provision under Article 356, meant to serve as a temporary corrective mechanism in times of breakdown in State governance, was invoked after the N Biren Singh-led BJP Government failed to contain the conflict that had erupted in May 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities. This marked only the latest chapter in a crisis that has deeply fractured Manipur’s social fabric, displaced tens of thousands, and paralyzed its political machinery.
President’s Rule, however, is not a panacea. It is, at best, a pause in democratic dysfunction—a brea- thing space for course correction, not a substitute for elected governance. The Union Cabinet’s recent decision to extend President’s Rule by another six months from August 13, 2025, raises a critical question: has this Constitutional interregnum brought Manipur closer to peace, or merely prolonged the state of suspended animation ?
The ethnic violence that erupted in May 2023 has so far claimed over 250 lives and displaced nearly 57,000 people, most of whom are still languishing in over 280 relief camps spread across the valley and the hills. What began as a localised flashpoint soon spiralled into a full-blown humanitarian and political crisis, with new areas such as Jiribam district—previously untouched by conflict— coming under the shadow of unrest. Between May 2023 and November 2024, recurring waves of violence, lootings, and targeted killings rendered large swathes of the State effectively ungovernable. The last major flare-up in November 2024 left 22 people dead over 11 days, underscoring the volatility that continues to haunt the region.
The resignation of Chief Minister N Biren Singh earlier this year created a political vacuum that the Union Government filled with direct control from New Delhi. But even during Singh’s tenure, the State had been increasingly run by bureaucrats and security forces, with the elected Government reduced to a symbolic entity. Critics argue that the Centre's lack of urgency and political will contributed to the deterioration, and that its continued over-reliance on administrative and security interventions, without meaningful political engagement, has limited its ability to mediate the deeper ethnic rift.
Efforts by Union Home Minister Amit Shah in early March 2025 to ease tensions by calling for unrestricted movement across the State collapsed on the very first day. The geographical segregation of the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities remains intact, maintained by informal buffer zones and informal blockades that have effectively balkanised Manipur. The collapse of this free movement initiative highlighted the absence of trust, as well as the clout of militant groups on both sides, many of whom operate with an alarming sense of impunity.
While the Government has initiated fresh negotiations with Kuki-Zo militant groups under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement to ensure the free flow of people and goods, these talks are at a delicate stage. Meanwhile, former Chief Secretary PK Singh has outlined a phased plan to relocate internally displaced persons by the end of the year. Yet, as thousands continue to live in temporary shelters, uncertainty and trauma remain the daily reality for many Manipuris.
Another unresolved issue is the unchecked circulation of illegal arms. Despite the Governor’s recent initiatives to retrieve looted weapons, approximately 3,000 firearms remain unaccounted for. These weapons not only pose a direct threat to peace efforts but also reinforce the authority of armed groups who have increasingly assumed political roles in their respective ethnic constituencies. Without credible and sustained de-weaponisation, reconciliation will remain out of reach.
The conflict in Manipur is not only about security—it is profoundly political. The demand by Kuki-Zo groups for a Separate Administration, citing systematic exclusion and discrimination under Meitei-dominated regimes, is met with equal vehemence by hardline Meitei groups who label Kukis as “outsiders.” This zero-sum identity politics has left little room for middle ground. The political chasm is now almost as stark as the physical one, with no functioning legislature to bridge the two.
In fact, the seventh session of the 12th Manipur Legislative Assembly, scheduled for February 10, 2025, was declared null and void by Governor Anusuiya Uikey, a move that underscored the Constitutional vacuum gripping the State. The last proper session was held in August 2024, and with the current absence of an elected Government, there is no clarity on when the Assembly will reconvene—if at all. The ongoing paralysis is dangerous, for it weakens democratic oversight and alienates the very people it purports to represent.
Ironically, this prolonged central rule comes at a time when the misuse of Article 356 has significantly declined. Once frequently invoked for political gains, especially during the pre-1990s era, the imposition of President’s Rule has become rare, thanks in large part to the landmark SR Bommai judgment of the Supreme Court and the growing assertiveness of regional parties. Its use in Manipur, though largely uncontested due to the grave internal security situation, still demands accountability, transparency, and most importantly, urgency.
Indeed, violence in the State has abated in recent months, and some displaced families have started returning home. But this fragile calm is not synonymous with peace. A fundamental shift in the State’s political architecture and ethnic relations remains elusive. NDA lawmakers from the Meitei and Naga communities have called for the restoration of an elected Government, fearing long-term disenfranchisement. On the other hand, Kuki-Zo groups remain deeply suspicious of any return to status quo leadership, perceiving it as a threat to their autonomy and security.
This impasse will not resolve itself. The Centre must take the lead in forging a new political consensus in Manipur, one that is inclusive, federal in spirit, and capable of addressing the legitimate aspirations of all communities. Administrative measures such as buffer zones, peace committees, or arms recovery drives, while essential, cannot substitute for democratic engagement. The BJP, which had once managed to unite the valley and the hills under a common platform, must revive its political credibility by facilitating open, transparent, and multi-ethnic consultations.
Moreover, civil society voices—so often stifled under earlier administrations—must be empowered. During N Biren Singh’s rule, several civil rights activists were reportedly hounded for ques- tioning the State’s biased handling of the conflict. A meaningful reconciliation process requires these voices at the table, not outside the gate. The role of student bodies, women’s organisations, religious leaders, and local media is crucial in reshaping public discourse and fostering mutual trust.
The continuation of President’s Rule may be legally justifiable for now, but it must not become an excuse for policy inertia. The Centre’s goal should not merely be the containment of violence but the restoration of functional demo- cracy. That includes preparing for fair and inclusive elections, reviving the Assembly, and ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are institutionalised, not improvised.
The people of Manipur deserve more than the absence of gunfire—they deserve justice, reconciliation, and above all, repre- sentation. It is time for India’s political leadership to stop outsourcing this crisis to the bureaucracy and start engaging with it politically. For only through genuine political will can Manipur escape the cycle of conflict and truly begin to heal.
(The writer can be reached at [email protected])
In February 2025, the Union Government imposed President’s Rule in Manipur, marking a turning point in the State’s prolonged descent into ethnic violence. The Constitutional provision under Article 356, meant to serve as a temporary corrective mechanism in times of breakdown in State governance, was invoked after the N Biren Singh-led BJP Government failed to contain the conflict that had erupted in May 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities. This marked only the latest chapter in a crisis that has deeply fractured Manipur’s social fabric, displaced tens of thousands, and paralyzed its political machinery.
President’s Rule, however, is not a panacea. It is, at best, a pause in democratic dysfunction—a brea- thing space for course correction, not a substitute for elected governance. The Union Cabinet’s recent decision to extend President’s Rule by another six months from August 13, 2025, raises a critical question: has this Constitutional interregnum brought Manipur closer to peace, or merely prolonged the state of suspended animation ?
The ethnic violence that erupted in May 2023 has so far claimed over 250 lives and displaced nearly 57,000 people, most of whom are still languishing in over 280 relief camps spread across the valley and the hills. What began as a localised flashpoint soon spiralled into a full-blown humanitarian and political crisis, with new areas such as Jiribam district—previously untouched by conflict— coming under the shadow of unrest. Between May 2023 and November 2024, recurring waves of violence, lootings, and targeted killings rendered large swathes of the State effectively ungovernable. The last major flare-up in November 2024 left 22 people dead over 11 days, underscoring the volatility that continues to haunt the region.
The resignation of Chief Minister N Biren Singh earlier this year created a political vacuum that the Union Government filled with direct control from New Delhi. But even during Singh’s tenure, the State had been increasingly run by bureaucrats and security forces, with the elected Government reduced to a symbolic entity. Critics argue that the Centre's lack of urgency and political will contributed to the deterioration, and that its continued over-reliance on administrative and security interventions, without meaningful political engagement, has limited its ability to mediate the deeper ethnic rift.
Efforts by Union Home Minister Amit Shah in early March 2025 to ease tensions by calling for unrestricted movement across the State collapsed on the very first day. The geographical segregation of the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities remains intact, maintained by informal buffer zones and informal blockades that have effectively balkanised Manipur. The collapse of this free movement initiative highlighted the absence of trust, as well as the clout of militant groups on both sides, many of whom operate with an alarming sense of impunity.
While the Government has initiated fresh negotiations with Kuki-Zo militant groups under the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement to ensure the free flow of people and goods, these talks are at a delicate stage. Meanwhile, former Chief Secretary PK Singh has outlined a phased plan to relocate internally displaced persons by the end of the year. Yet, as thousands continue to live in temporary shelters, uncertainty and trauma remain the daily reality for many Manipuris.
Another unresolved issue is the unchecked circulation of illegal arms. Despite the Governor’s recent initiatives to retrieve looted weapons, approximately 3,000 firearms remain unaccounted for. These weapons not only pose a direct threat to peace efforts but also reinforce the authority of armed groups who have increasingly assumed political roles in their respective ethnic constituencies. Without credible and sustained de-weaponisation, reconciliation will remain out of reach.
The conflict in Manipur is not only about security—it is profoundly political. The demand by Kuki-Zo groups for a Separate Administration, citing systematic exclusion and discrimination under Meitei-dominated regimes, is met with equal vehemence by hardline Meitei groups who label Kukis as “outsiders.” This zero-sum identity politics has left little room for middle ground. The political chasm is now almost as stark as the physical one, with no functioning legislature to bridge the two.
In fact, the seventh session of the 12th Manipur Legislative Assembly, scheduled for February 10, 2025, was declared null and void by Governor Anusuiya Uikey, a move that underscored the Constitutional vacuum gripping the State. The last proper session was held in August 2024, and with the current absence of an elected Government, there is no clarity on when the Assembly will reconvene—if at all. The ongoing paralysis is dangerous, for it weakens democratic oversight and alienates the very people it purports to represent.
Ironically, this prolonged central rule comes at a time when the misuse of Article 356 has significantly declined. Once frequently invoked for political gains, especially during the pre-1990s era, the imposition of President’s Rule has become rare, thanks in large part to the landmark SR Bommai judgment of the Supreme Court and the growing assertiveness of regional parties. Its use in Manipur, though largely uncontested due to the grave internal security situation, still demands accountability, transparency, and most importantly, urgency.
Indeed, violence in the State has abated in recent months, and some displaced families have started returning home. But this fragile calm is not synonymous with peace. A fundamental shift in the State’s political architecture and ethnic relations remains elusive. NDA lawmakers from the Meitei and Naga communities have called for the restoration of an elected Government, fearing long-term disenfranchisement. On the other hand, Kuki-Zo groups remain deeply suspicious of any return to status quo leadership, perceiving it as a threat to their autonomy and security.
This impasse will not resolve itself. The Centre must take the lead in forging a new political consensus in Manipur, one that is inclusive, federal in spirit, and capable of addressing the legitimate aspirations of all communities. Administrative measures such as buffer zones, peace committees, or arms recovery drives, while essential, cannot substitute for democratic engagement. The BJP, which had once managed to unite the valley and the hills under a common platform, must revive its political credibility by facilitating open, transparent, and multi-ethnic consultations.
Moreover, civil society voices—so often stifled under earlier administrations—must be empowered. During N Biren Singh’s rule, several civil rights activists were reportedly hounded for ques- tioning the State’s biased handling of the conflict. A meaningful reconciliation process requires these voices at the table, not outside the gate. The role of student bodies, women’s organisations, religious leaders, and local media is crucial in reshaping public discourse and fostering mutual trust.
The continuation of President’s Rule may be legally justifiable for now, but it must not become an excuse for policy inertia. The Centre’s goal should not merely be the containment of violence but the restoration of functional demo- cracy. That includes preparing for fair and inclusive elections, reviving the Assembly, and ensuring that peacebuilding efforts are institutionalised, not improvised.
The people of Manipur deserve more than the absence of gunfire—they deserve justice, reconciliation, and above all, repre- sentation. It is time for India’s political leadership to stop outsourcing this crisis to the bureaucracy and start engaging with it politically. For only through genuine political will can Manipur escape the cycle of conflict and truly begin to heal.
(The writer can be reached at [email protected])