Bangladesh in turmoil : India’s strategic imperatives
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Lt General (Veteran) L Nishikanta Singh
Indo–Bangladesh relations have entered a deeply uncertain and volatile phase after Sheikh Hasina was forced to leave the country. In recent days, tensions have escalated alarmingly following the brutal lynching of a Hindu youth. While many describe this as mob violence, available evidence and patterns of intimidation strongly suggest a pre-meditated, politically motivated act, aimed at sending a chilling message to Bangladesh’s minorities ahead of elections.
The message appears unmistakable: if certain Islamist and radical political forces come to power, the Constitutional and social ethos born out of the 1971 Liberation War will be dismantled. Minorities who once lived with relative security are now facing systematic attacks—Temples vandalised, homes torched, women humiliated, and entire neighborhoods terrorised. The innocent Hindu population, along with Buddhists and other minorities, is living under constant fear.
Recent reports indicate a fresh wave of coordinated attacks against the Hindu community across multiple districts. Several temples have been desecrated, idols destroyed, and properties looted. Videos emerging from Bangladesh are deeply disturbing—showing public beatings, arson, and forced displacement. Thousands, especially minorities, are fleeing simply to survive.
This crisis is particularly painful for India. Bangladesh is a country whose independence in 1971 was secured with immense Indian sacrifice. Thousands of Indian soldiers laid down their lives, and India bore enormous economic and military costs to liberate Bangladesh from Pakistani genocide. Yet today, radical groups are openly raising anti-India slogans, burning Indian flags, and portraying India as an enemy.
Naturally, many Indians are asking : What should India do now ?
The immediate future of Bangladesh appears unstable. The caretaker Government seems incapable of enforcing law and order, creating a dangerous power vacuum. Islamist radical organisations such as Jamaat-e-Islami are rapidly gaining ground, reportedly with covert support from Pakistan and strategic backing from China. Disturbingly, several Western Nations appear either indifferent or indirectly complicit—by funding NGOs that turn a blind eye to radicalism or by remaining silent spectators to minority persecution.
India’s Strategic Stakes and Historical Mistakes
India must now act decisively to protect its National interests. To an extent, preparations are already underway. However, before outlining future options, it is crucial to revisit a historic strategic error—the mishandling of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT).
The Chittagong Hill Tracts, comprising Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Bandarban districts, cover nearly 13,200 square kilometres—about 10% of Bangladesh’s territory. The region shares borders with Tripura and Mizoram and is ethnically, culturally, and historically closer to India’s North East.
At Independence in 1947, the largely non-Muslim indigenous popula- tion— Chakmas, Marmas, Tripuris—hoisted the Indian flag in Rangamati, expressing their desire to join India. A delegation appealed to Delhi. While Sardar Patel was sympathetic, Jawaharlal Nehru declined intervention, and the region was handed over to Pakistan. This decision proved catastrophic.
Subsequently, Pakistan—and later Bangladesh— pursued aggressive demographic engineering by settling Muslims in CHT. From 98% non-Muslim, the indigenous population has now been reduced to nearly 50%, through killings, displacement, and forced migration. These communities— Buddhists, Hindus, and Animists—maintain deep ethnic ties with tribes in Tripura and Mizoram.
The Siliguri Corridor: India’s Achilles Heel
India’s greatest vulnerability in this context is the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow land bridge connecting the North East to the rest of India. At its narrowest, it is only 22 kilometres wide and around 200 kilometres long. Bangladesh lies to its south, Bhutan and Nepal to the north, and the Chinese military presence in the Chumbi Valley is barely 45 kilometres away.
Every critical supply line—highways (NH-10, NH-27), railways, oil pipelines, military logistics—passes through this corridor. A blockade, even temporary, could sever the entire North East from mainland India. China’s extensive infrastructure buildup in Tibet has further heightened this threat. Notably, extremist voices in Bangladesh have repeatedly threatened to cut off this “chicken’s neck.”
India’s Ongoing and Necessary Responses
India has begun responding to these threats by establishing four new military bases at Kishanganj (Bihar), Chopra (West Bengal), near Dhubri (Assam), and Parva (Mizoram).
The BSF is setting up 85 modern border outposts along the Bangladesh border, equipped with advanced surveillance, drone and counter-drone systems, and rapid-response capabilities.
These steps indicate that India is preparing for multiple contingencies—ranging from refugee influx and cross-border terrorism to full-scale military escalation.
Bangladesh’s Own Vulnerabilities
It is equally important to recognise that Bangladesh has its own strategic chokepoints: Rangpur Corridor–only about 80 km wide and Feni–Chittagong Corridor – merely 15–30 km wide, providing access to the Bay of Bengal.
In the event of a serious conflict, India could secure the Rangpur division, widening its own corridor from 22 km to nearly 100 km. Capturing the Feni area would grant India direct access to the Bay of Bengal, effectively splitting Bangladesh into two. The Indian Army’s expertise in riverine warfare, demonstrated decisively in 1971, has since expanded manifold.
Humanitarian Responsibility : India cannot ignore the ethnic cleansing-like targeting of minorities in CHT. Supporting indigenous self-defence, autonomy, or international protection me- chanisms would align with India’s moral and civili-sational responsibilities.
CHT as a Strategic Buffer : Supporting greater autonomy—or independence—of CHT would create a buffer zone against Islamist radicalism, securing India’s Northeast from extremist spillover.
Direct Sea Access for the North East : From southern Tripura, the Bay of Bengal is barely 25 km away through CHT. Access would revolutionise trade, logistics, military mobility, and economic development in the North East.
Correcting the 1947 Injustice : Incorporating or protecting CHT would rectify a historic wrong, as the region’s overwhelming non-Muslim population clearly belonged to India during Partition.
Countering China–Pakistan Axis : A firm Indian posture in eastern South Asia would blunt China’s strategic encirclement and Pakistan’s proxy ambitions.
Conclusion
Bangladesh stands at a crossroads—between its secular, pluralistic origins and a descent into radicalism and instability. For India, this is not merely a neighbourhood crisis but a direct National security challenge. Strategic restraint must now give way to strategic clarity. Protecting minorities, securing India’s North East, neutralising extremist threats, and correcting historical mistakes are no longer optional—they are imperatives.
History has offered India a second chance. Whether it seizes it will shape the future of South Asia.
The writer was the seniormost officer of the Military Intelligence Corps for 5 years
Indo–Bangladesh relations have entered a deeply uncertain and volatile phase after Sheikh Hasina was forced to leave the country. In recent days, tensions have escalated alarmingly following the brutal lynching of a Hindu youth. While many describe this as mob violence, available evidence and patterns of intimidation strongly suggest a pre-meditated, politically motivated act, aimed at sending a chilling message to Bangladesh’s minorities ahead of elections.
The message appears unmistakable: if certain Islamist and radical political forces come to power, the Constitutional and social ethos born out of the 1971 Liberation War will be dismantled. Minorities who once lived with relative security are now facing systematic attacks—Temples vandalised, homes torched, women humiliated, and entire neighborhoods terrorised. The innocent Hindu population, along with Buddhists and other minorities, is living under constant fear.
Recent reports indicate a fresh wave of coordinated attacks against the Hindu community across multiple districts. Several temples have been desecrated, idols destroyed, and properties looted. Videos emerging from Bangladesh are deeply disturbing—showing public beatings, arson, and forced displacement. Thousands, especially minorities, are fleeing simply to survive.
This crisis is particularly painful for India. Bangladesh is a country whose independence in 1971 was secured with immense Indian sacrifice. Thousands of Indian soldiers laid down their lives, and India bore enormous economic and military costs to liberate Bangladesh from Pakistani genocide. Yet today, radical groups are openly raising anti-India slogans, burning Indian flags, and portraying India as an enemy.
Naturally, many Indians are asking : What should India do now ?
The immediate future of Bangladesh appears unstable. The caretaker Government seems incapable of enforcing law and order, creating a dangerous power vacuum. Islamist radical organisations such as Jamaat-e-Islami are rapidly gaining ground, reportedly with covert support from Pakistan and strategic backing from China. Disturbingly, several Western Nations appear either indifferent or indirectly complicit—by funding NGOs that turn a blind eye to radicalism or by remaining silent spectators to minority persecution.
India’s Strategic Stakes and Historical Mistakes
India must now act decisively to protect its National interests. To an extent, preparations are already underway. However, before outlining future options, it is crucial to revisit a historic strategic error—the mishandling of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT).
The Chittagong Hill Tracts, comprising Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Bandarban districts, cover nearly 13,200 square kilometres—about 10% of Bangladesh’s territory. The region shares borders with Tripura and Mizoram and is ethnically, culturally, and historically closer to India’s North East.
At Independence in 1947, the largely non-Muslim indigenous popula- tion— Chakmas, Marmas, Tripuris—hoisted the Indian flag in Rangamati, expressing their desire to join India. A delegation appealed to Delhi. While Sardar Patel was sympathetic, Jawaharlal Nehru declined intervention, and the region was handed over to Pakistan. This decision proved catastrophic.
Subsequently, Pakistan—and later Bangladesh— pursued aggressive demographic engineering by settling Muslims in CHT. From 98% non-Muslim, the indigenous population has now been reduced to nearly 50%, through killings, displacement, and forced migration. These communities— Buddhists, Hindus, and Animists—maintain deep ethnic ties with tribes in Tripura and Mizoram.
The Siliguri Corridor: India’s Achilles Heel
India’s greatest vulnerability in this context is the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow land bridge connecting the North East to the rest of India. At its narrowest, it is only 22 kilometres wide and around 200 kilometres long. Bangladesh lies to its south, Bhutan and Nepal to the north, and the Chinese military presence in the Chumbi Valley is barely 45 kilometres away.
Every critical supply line—highways (NH-10, NH-27), railways, oil pipelines, military logistics—passes through this corridor. A blockade, even temporary, could sever the entire North East from mainland India. China’s extensive infrastructure buildup in Tibet has further heightened this threat. Notably, extremist voices in Bangladesh have repeatedly threatened to cut off this “chicken’s neck.”
India’s Ongoing and Necessary Responses
India has begun responding to these threats by establishing four new military bases at Kishanganj (Bihar), Chopra (West Bengal), near Dhubri (Assam), and Parva (Mizoram).
The BSF is setting up 85 modern border outposts along the Bangladesh border, equipped with advanced surveillance, drone and counter-drone systems, and rapid-response capabilities.
These steps indicate that India is preparing for multiple contingencies—ranging from refugee influx and cross-border terrorism to full-scale military escalation.
Bangladesh’s Own Vulnerabilities
It is equally important to recognise that Bangladesh has its own strategic chokepoints: Rangpur Corridor–only about 80 km wide and Feni–Chittagong Corridor – merely 15–30 km wide, providing access to the Bay of Bengal.
In the event of a serious conflict, India could secure the Rangpur division, widening its own corridor from 22 km to nearly 100 km. Capturing the Feni area would grant India direct access to the Bay of Bengal, effectively splitting Bangladesh into two. The Indian Army’s expertise in riverine warfare, demonstrated decisively in 1971, has since expanded manifold.
Humanitarian Responsibility : India cannot ignore the ethnic cleansing-like targeting of minorities in CHT. Supporting indigenous self-defence, autonomy, or international protection me- chanisms would align with India’s moral and civili-sational responsibilities.
CHT as a Strategic Buffer : Supporting greater autonomy—or independence—of CHT would create a buffer zone against Islamist radicalism, securing India’s Northeast from extremist spillover.
Direct Sea Access for the North East : From southern Tripura, the Bay of Bengal is barely 25 km away through CHT. Access would revolutionise trade, logistics, military mobility, and economic development in the North East.
Correcting the 1947 Injustice : Incorporating or protecting CHT would rectify a historic wrong, as the region’s overwhelming non-Muslim population clearly belonged to India during Partition.
Countering China–Pakistan Axis : A firm Indian posture in eastern South Asia would blunt China’s strategic encirclement and Pakistan’s proxy ambitions.
Conclusion
Bangladesh stands at a crossroads—between its secular, pluralistic origins and a descent into radicalism and instability. For India, this is not merely a neighbourhood crisis but a direct National security challenge. Strategic restraint must now give way to strategic clarity. Protecting minorities, securing India’s North East, neutralising extremist threats, and correcting historical mistakes are no longer optional—they are imperatives.
History has offered India a second chance. Whether it seizes it will shape the future of South Asia.
The writer was the seniormost officer of the Military Intelligence Corps for 5 years