Myanmar in turmoil Civil war, fragmented war, geopolitics of great powers and regional interests

Lt General (Veteran) L Nishikanta Singh
Introduction
Since the military coup on 1 February 2021 Myan-mar has been engulfed in widespread armed conflict, political fragmentation, and humanitarian crisis. What began as mass protests against the military rule evolved into a Nationwide civil war, involving the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military), the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), and numerous ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) operating in alliance or independently. Recently held ‘election’ appears to be a smoke screen for the international consumption. The conflict has drawn significant regional and international interest like China, the United States, India, and Bangladesh, each with distinct motivations tied to security, economic corridors, and strategic balance in South and Southeast Asia.
Territorial Control and Insurgent Capabilities : A fragmented territorial control
The actual governance and control of Myanmar today are highly fractured. Independent assessments indicate that the junta controls less than half, perhaps only one-third to one-fifth of Myanmar’s territory, concentrating mainly in urban centers such as Yangon, Mandalay, and the capital Naypyidaw.
Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and allied resistance forces have expanded control in States such as Shan, Kayah (Karenni), Chin, and Rakhine. In Chin State, insurgents now claim control of approx. 85% of the region.
In Rakhine State, the Arakan Army (AA) captured all Myanmar town- ships bordering Bangladesh (Maungdaw, Buthidaung, Paletwa) in late 2024, undermining junta territorial integrity along this volatile frontier. Some analysts estimate that EAOs and PDFs control up to 40–60% or more of territory, if contested regions are included, though precise figures vary depending on the source.
Insurgent Capabilities
The insurgent forces include Ethnic Armed Orga- nizations (EAOs) such as Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence Army (KIA), Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). They have long-standing military experience and strong territorial bases in their respective areas.
The People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) was formed after the coup, largely by former civilian protestors and volunteers. But have grown rapidly by cooperating with EAOs.
There are estimates of 50,000–100,000 resistance fighters across Myanmar in different units, but arms and sophisticated weapons remain limited. Many Kuki militants of Manipur, including some who are under Suspension of Operation (SoO) with Indian Government and non-SOO groups are reportedly operating under PDF.
The insurgent forces’ capabilities are asymmetric but due to local support, regional sanctuaries, and with improving coordination, they have pressured the junta and limited its effective control.
Myanmar Government and Military (Tatmadaw) Control : A Constitutional Authority vs. Ground Reality
The State Administration Council (SAC)-the junta, remains the internationally visible authority controlling National institutions, major cities, and formal diplomatic relations. However, on ground, military control is limited. Independent trackers suggest the junta has stable control in a minority of townships, with much of the countryside contested or effectively held by insurgents. Even in junta-held cities, security is fragile, with resistance attacks and strikes targeting urban infrastructure.
Military Capability and Limitations
The Tatmadaw retains conventional military capabilities, though significantly degraded, including artillery, air, and armored units. Its use of air power causes persistent civilian casualties. However, battlefield setbacks and loss of key command centers have eroded its ability to assert Nationwide authority.
Chinese Interests in Myanmar : Economic and Strategic Footprint
China has significant economic interests in Myanmar, including key infrastructure and energy projects. Myanmar provides Beijing access to the Indian Ocean, particularly through ports like Kyaukphyu, which are strategic for China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) bypassing Malacca Strait.
China uses both inland waterways and land communication for connecting Yunan with sea through CMEC. These are critical to China’s strategic access to maritime routes.
Military and Diplomatic Support
China view the Myanmar military Government as a partner to safe- guard its economic interests and prevent spillover instability along its border. It has provided military assistance, including aviation, surveillance technologies, and financial support to the junta. Though Beijing has not publicly supported the insurgents, yet its broader engagement includes balancing relationships both with the junta and insurgents basically to preserve stability.
Naval Presence and Maritime Interests
China’s naval interests in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean extend from its broader blue-water strategy. Myanmar’s ports, especially Kyaukphyu, are reported to be hosting Chinese intelligence assts and naval logistics, giving Beijing a foothold in the Indian Ocean region.
The US Interests and Funding : US Assistance to Myanmar and Refugees
In 2024, the Biden administration gave appro- ximately $130 million for needs in Myanmar. The US funding officially is to covers humanitarian aid, demo- cracy support, civil society, health, and emergency relief. However, how the actual use is not known.
Strategic and Policy Interests
The US aim is to counter Chinese influence, as part of a broader strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Recent reports and analyses suggest that the US is increasingly interested in the western region of Myanmar, specifically Rakhine and Chin States. The US has not formally proposed establishing a new State but there are unconfirmed reports indicating a strategic interest towards that end with a view for shaping a post-junta, decentralized Myanmar with auto- nomy for ethnic regions.
Key Aspects of US Interest in Myanmar’s Western Region (Rakhine/Chin)
The US is actively trying to shape the future of Myanmar’s western region by engaging with the dominant power on the ground (the AA) and promoting a democratic, federal, and decentralized model, largely to mitigate Chinese strategic gains in the Indian Ocean.
Key points are:
i) Countering China’s Influence : Rakhine State is strategically vital, hosting major Chinese infrastructure projects, including oil and gas pipelines that bypass the Malacca Strait. Increased US engagement in this area will challenge Beijing’s pre-sence in the Bay of Bengal.
ii) Support for Autonomous Forces : Reports suggest the US is engaging with or providing non-lethal support to anti-junta resistance groups, including the Arakan Army (AA), which controls a significant portion of Rakhine State. The Arakan Army has effectively moved to establish a de facto autonomous government in the region.
iii) Humanitarian Corridor Initiative: In 2025, US officials discussed establishing a ‘humanitarian corri- dor’ through Bangladesh into Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Critics have interpreted this initiative as a potential ‘beachhead’ for Western influence, aimed at managing the crisis and supporting local governance structures. This has been resisted by Bangladesh.
iv) The BURMA Act 2022: This enables the US to provide non-lethal assistance to the National Unity Government (NUG), ethnic armed groups, and People’s Defence Forces (PDFs).
v) Concerns Over ‘Christian State’ Rumors : Some reports suggest, albeit with speculative overtones, that US interests in the Chin-Kuki-Zo areas, along the border of Myanmar, India, and Bangladesh. This could potentially align with the development of a Christian-majority State that would serve as a long-term ally in South Asia.
vi) Strategic Dilemma: Though the US aims to support democracy, but its engagement with the AA is complicated by the group’s independent, ethno-nationalist agenda and its complex, often adversarial, relationship with the Rohingya population.
Bangladesh’s Position and Concerns : Rohingya Refugee Crisis
Bangladesh has over a million Rohingya refugees in camps near Cox’s Bazar, a consequence of both the 2017 atrocities and continued instability in Rakhine State. Renewed conflict, including insurgent advances, raises fears of further displacement and humanitarian strain on Bangladesh.
Border Security and Incursions
Bangladesh’s interests include preventing spillover violence, ensuring border stability, and negotiating with stakeholders to protect its territorial integrity and humanitarian commitments. As the Arakan Army controls border townships ad- jacent to Bangladesh, Dhaka remains alert to cross-border incursions, armed movements, and refugee flows, necessitating close monitoring and coordination. There are reports of recent venturing into Bangladesh unopposed by AA.
India’s Interests
Myanmar, in the east, is a one of the 4 large neighbour of India. Northern Myanmar also acts as buffer to India and China, preventing direct link in the east.
Our ‘Act East Policy’ and ‘Kaladan Project’ is through Myanmar. Also, the presence of Indian Insurgents is a concern for India.
Act East and Connectivity Projects
i) Myanmar is central to India’s Act East Policy, offering routes to Southeast Asia for trade and economic integration.
ii) The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) is strategic. It is to connect India’s North East States to the Bay of Bengal via Myanmar’s Sittwe port and inland waterways. But it’s delayed, with operational goals now projected for 2027. These projects, to some degree, will contest the Chinese influence in western Myan- mar.
Engagement with Insurgents and Diplomacy
With ongoing conflict and shakier junta control, India has begun limited engagement with insurgent groups, particularly the Arakan Army (AA) and others who are controlling Rakhine and Chin State border areas.
Indian lawmakers and officials reportedly met with AA representatives in recent past, reflecting a tactical shift as insurgents control critical territories affecting India’s connectivity aspirations. India seeks to balance border security, insurgent spillover, and infrastructure continuity, without fully legitimizing armed groups. It also regularly engages in security dialogues with Myanmar’s military and cooperates on counter- insur- gency efforts along the border.
Indian Insurgent Groups Insurgent movements involving India’s Northeast, have historic linkages with cross-border networks, complicating stability on India’s eastern frontier. Indian forces have at times engaged insurgent camps across the border as part of broader security strategy. India would want Myanmar to be more tough.
Key strategic actions for India regarding Myanmar include:
i) Humanitarian Aid & Border Management: Establish cross-border humanitarian camps to provide food, medicine, and shelter.
ii) Dual Engagement: Move beyond dealing only with the military junta and actively engage with democratic, civil society, and ethnic resistance groups like the National Unity Government (NUG).
iii) Security & Stability: Enhance security cooperation to prevent cross-border crime and insurgency, ensuring insta- bility in Myanmar does not directly impact India’s North Eastern States.
iv) Infrastructure Pro-jects: Prioritize the com- pletion of the Kaladan Multi-modal Transport Project and the Trilateral Highway.
v) Diplomatic Balancing: Actively advocate for a return to democracy, countering China’s influence by presenting India as a more responsible, non-exploitative partner.
Conclusion
Myanmar’s current situation reflects a complex mosaic of military fragmentation, emergent insurgent governance, and powerful external interests. With the junta’s control shrinking and insurgent groups gaining influence, the internal conflict intersects with geopolitical strategies of China, the United States, India, and neighboring Bangladesh. India should pursue a balanced, proactive, and multi- dimensional policy. The writer is visiting faculty Southeast Asian Studies Dept, Manipur University